Mock trial reveals problems with electronic surveillance records

By | December 10, 2009, 1:58pm PST

Summary: The right to a fair trial is paramount in a democracy, especially in the nation that is the birth place of the Magna Carta of 1215. 795 years later, there are a few unknown questions that the Home Office wanted to flush out.

The right to a fair trial is paramount in a democracy, especially in the nation that is the birth place of the Magna Carta of 1215. 795 years later, there are a few unknown questions that the Home Office wanted to flush out. Among them is the use of electronic surveillance techniques used.  Would the evidence stand up before the courts, what needed to be disclosed, and how would a defence team act upon such evidence. Turns out, the problems are many.

In a BBC report, the Home Office decided to test such concerns in a set of mock trials. What they revealed has humbled more than a few experts.;

A series of mock trials showed that using e-mails and phone taps was not compatible with strict rules around the disclosure of evidence to the defence.

Storing such material would also be too difficult and costly, the trials found.

That was the first set of problems determined. The financial costs, while absurd, are valid. Given the quality of security, IT management required for such records is expensive. The second set of issues are ones that likely defeat such use of information in several circumstances, in particular terrorism cases.

Under current UK law, material from intercepted e-mails or phone calls can be used only for intelligence purposes, but a possible method by which it could be used in court was devised in a Privy Council review.

Under the model, the prosecution did not have to store, transcribe and disclose all intercepted material to the defence, but independent lawyers said this was not compatible with the suspect’s human rights.

Sir Geoffrey Grigson, a former judge who took part in the mock trials, said allowing the material could also have serious operational implications.

“With intercept, that will almost certainly require disclosure to the defence of information regarding techniques used by agencies and their capacities,” he said.

The last issue winds up being a significant barrier. Intelligence communities are certainly not going to give a defence team or the public information on what techniques it uses. Home Secretary Alan Johnson commented;

Home Secretary Alan Johnson said it was “disappointing” that the trials had failed, but “no responsible government could proceed with implementation on this basis”.

“Because of the additional demand on resources to make intercept as evidence admissible in court, this model could jeopardise national security and damage our ability to bring terrorists and other serious criminals to justice,” he said.

The legal system is not perfect and experts agree that there are ways to protect evidence gathering techniques. The question is, will the public accept automatic policies and safeguards? A method of peer review will clearly be required before adoption can take place. Possibly a security-cleared Defence Trial Body can be created enabling key defence witness experts to testify before the courts and validating if specific kinds of evidence can be submitted before the courts.

Poll

Should surveillance techniques be kept secret and allow the evidence gathered, to be used in a Court of Law without scrutiny?

Kick off your day with ZDNet's daily e-mail newsletter. It's the freshest tech news and opinion, served hot. Get it.

Topics

Disclosure

Doug Hanchard

http://government.zdnet.com/?page_id=5774

Biography

Doug Hanchard

Doug is the principal of Rapid Response Consulting, an advisory group that integrates ICT solutions. He has worked at some of the largest telecommunications firms in Canada, including Bell Canada, Telus and AT&T and is a guest lecturer for several universities and associations. He serves on several advisory boards in Canada and the United States.

Starting with a new national ISP in 1993 in sales, positioning internet access, web sites and network services began the path of telecommunications technologies from the early Bulletin Board Services (BBS) to the first web pages for commercial clients.

Became the National Data Network Service Manager for Frame Relay and Internet access for AccTel Enterprises which was acquired (after 3 mergers already) by AT&T Canada. Interested in how marketing could expand service availability, he moved to Telus to become the Frame Relay / ATM Product Manager and expanded the network across Canada. In 2002 he went to Bell Canada becoming a Solution Architect to get back to his passion for technology working with enterprise clients. In 2006, became the Director of R&D and Senior Solution Architect for Bell Canada Security Solutions Inc, developing I.P. based physical and logical security platforms and ICT services.

This position created new commercial concepts such as Crisis and Disaster technology solutions required for emergency use after an event occurred. He designed interoperable technologies and application combinations allowing any to any I.P. service through landline, broadband, satellite and wireless technologies to be deployed anywhere

Related Discussions on TechRepublic

Did you know you can take part in these discussions with your ZDNet membership?
2
Comments

Join the conversation!

Just In

Both yes and no
don3605 15th Dec 2009
It is proper for the details of the intercept to be protected. However there must be procedures and protocols in place to protect the intercepts from tampering. Just as with any other evidence, there is a trail of custody and records to document the "purity" of the evidence. Things such as the original surveillance being gathered onto non-modifiable media. There should always be scrutiny of the evidence, but just like fingerprints, blood and DNA, it is possible to maintain the "purity" of electronic evidence.
0 Votes
+ -
... they'll just get 'experts' to invalidate all evidence gathered electronically.

Clever!
0 Votes
+ -
Both yes and no
don3605 15th Dec 2009
It is proper for the details of the intercept to be protected. However there must be procedures and protocols in place to protect the intercepts from tampering. Just as with any other evidence, there is a trail of custody and records to document the "purity" of the evidence. Things such as the original surveillance being gathered onto non-modifiable media. There should always be scrutiny of the evidence, but just like fingerprints, blood and DNA, it is possible to maintain the "purity" of electronic evidence.

Join the conversation!

Formatting +
BB Codes - Note: HTML is not supported in forums
  • [b] Bold [/b]
  • [i] Italic [/i]
  • [u] Underline [/u]
  • [s] Strikethrough [/s]
  • [q] "Quote" [/q]
  • [ol][*] 1. Ordered List [/ol]
  • [ul][*] · Unordered List [/ul]
  • [pre] Preformat [/pre]
  • [quote] "Blockquote" [/quote]
ie8 fix

The best of ZDNet, delivered

ZDNet Newsletters

Get the best of ZDNet delivered straight to your inbox

Facebook Activity

White Papers, Webcasts, & Resources
ie8 fix