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Zero Day

Ryan Naraine and Dancho Danchev

The current state of the crimeware threat - Q&A

By | March 19, 2010, 12:55pm PDT

Summary: What’s the current state of the crimeware threat? Just how vibrant is the underground marketplace when it comes to crimeware? What are ISPs doing, and should ISPs be doing to solve the problem? Does taking down a cybercrime-friendly ISP has any long term effect?

With Zeus crimeware infections reaching epidemic levels, two-factor authentication under fire, and the actual DIY (do-it-yourself) kit becoming more sophisticated, it’s time to reassess the situation by discussing the current and emerging crimeware trends.

What’s the current state of the crimeware threat? Just how vibrant is the underground marketplace when it comes to crimeware? What are ISPs doing, and should ISPs be doing to solve the problem? Does taking down a cybercrime-friendly ISP has any long term effect?

I asked Thorsten Holz, researcher at Vienna University of Technology, whose team not only participated in the recent takedown of the Waledac botnet, but released an interesting paper earlier this year, summarizing their findings based on 33GB of crimeware data obtained from active campaigns.

Go through the Q&A.

Dancho: Were you surprised that you were able to extract the data from the crimeware dropzones, so easily? Given the quality assurance practices that these people often put into their campaigns, it’s logical to assume that they’ve taken basic precautions on the server/kit level.

Are cybercriminals taking the operational security of their campaigns seriously?

Thorsten: Actually I was rather surprised that we found so many open dropzones, it seems like the attackers do not follow security best practices. Especially earlier versions of Nethell had very often an open directory where all log files could be found by simply browsing to the correct URL. For ZeuS, we found only a handful of open dropzones, it seems like the attackers using that toolkit have more clue about what they are doing. Unfortunately, this has changed in the recent months: by now, most dropzones are configured correctly by default and thus it is not common anymore to find open dropzones.

Dancho: Considering the fact that security researchers are clearly capable of extracting campaign data, it’s fairly logical to assume that cybercriminals are also peeking into each other’s botnets, Zeus in particular.

Do you agree or disagree?

Thorsten: Yes, that definitely makes sense. Presumably an attacker can also use other methods to access a dropzone from another attacker: an attacker could exploit vulnerabilities in the dropzone’s web app (e.g., SQL injection, default passwords, open MySQL access etc.), something that we could not do as part of our research. There have been some reports about vulnerabilities in dropzone kits, and I am sure that one could find other ways to access a dropzone.

Dancho: With Zeus clearly reaching a monocultural stage within the cybercrime marketplace, a remotely exploitable flaw within the kit’s web interface could trigger an effect often seen from a white hat’s perspective. In fact, there have been cases of cybercriminals hijacking one another’s Zeus botnet due to insecurely configured web servers.

Do you believe these are isolated incidents, or a logical development in the long term, which could contribute to the rise of underground turf wars?

Thorsten: I think that this is a logical development: If I would be an attacker, it would be way easier to simply exploit other dropzones than doing all the hard work on my own (buying the kit, hosting it, exploiting machines etc.). And with tools such as ZeuS Tracker I could also easily find other dropzones and perform my attack on a larger scale.

Dancho: Since not every cybercriminal is willing to invest money into purchasing the very latest Zeus release, hundreds of them continue using old releases while continuing to update the “Web Injections” list.

A few months ago, based on an observation of ongoing discussions on the topic, I became aware of the fact that certain cybercriminals are in fact attempting to use the ZeusTracker to build hit list of potentially exploitable targets.

A trend, a fad, or someone’s basically scratching the surface here?

Thorsten: I see this as a trend: since the information is freely available, it makes sense from an attacker’s point of view to take advantage of it. Presumably it requires only some coding effort to crawl ZeuS Tracker, extract the info about the dropzone, and then probe it for open access or vulnerabilities.

Managed crimeware services, or raw crimeware logs as a service? –>

Topics

Dancho Danchev is an independent security consultant and cyber threats analyst, with extensive experience in open source intelligence gathering, malware and cybercrime incident response.

Disclosure

Dancho Danchev

More details on Dancho Danchev's current and past professional affiliations, can be found in his LinkedIn profile.

Biography

Dancho Danchev

Dancho Danchev is an independent security consultant and cyber threats analyst, with extensive experience in open source intelligence gathering, and cybercrime incident response. He's been an active security blogger since 2007, and maintains a popular security blog sharing real-time threats intelligence data with the rest of the community on a daily basis. More details on Dancho Danchev's current and past professional affiliations, can be found in his LinkedIn profile. You can also follow him on Twitter

Talkback Most Recent of 6 Talkback(s)

  • Just out of curiosity..
    ..which platforms are this kit available for?

    OSX? Windows? Linux? *BSD? *Solaris? Some combination of the above?
    ZDNet Gravatar
    AzuMao
    19th Mar 2010
  • Nothing particularly revealing here
    as we all know cybercrime continues to grow, and malware is anything but contained. But it's always interesting to hear the assessments of an expert in the field like Thorsten Holz.

    Notifications would be nice, I hope that more ISPs adopt this model in the future and finally start to do something. After all, they are in a good position to do this - perhaps some legal ruling would help here, forcing ISPs to pro-actively adopting some security mechanisms. Actually some German ISPs plan to build such a system, the government will also support this.

    Another step in the right direction, though its effectiveness hinges on cooperation between various international agencies - and a little (long overdue) thrust.
    ZDNet Gravatar
    klumper
    20th Mar 2010
  • Maybe it's time to rewrite a few protocols and languages.
    Sigh - you know, maybe it's time to rewrite a lot of our
    protocols and languages for better security? IMO a lot of
    this is possible because a lot of stuff just was never
    designed for security in the early days of the Internet.
    Maybe it's time to rewrite stuff from the ground up for
    security.
    ZDNet Gravatar
    CobraA1
    20th Mar 2010
  • Or a USB stick, perhaps.
    A USB stick is all it takes to get a windows machine infected. It's so easy!
    ZDNet Gravatar
    Great Kahuna
    22nd Mar 2010
  • RE: The current state of the crimeware threat - Q&A
    Criminals, like any other organism or organization, follow resources--usually money because it is most easily converted and moved.

    The ability and proficiancy levels of criminals mirror the society--smart ones will eventually become more proficient at targeting.

    But because the effort involved in attacks is minuscule (and uses stolen resources) there isn't the drive to specialize and target that physical crime requires.

    Thus the specialization will proceed more slowly than in physical crimes where the resource devotion is much higher.

    Stupid criminals do a poor job of targeting. This is why we still have bank hold-ups, despite the fact that the proceeds are low (~98% failure rate.)

    But if the opportunity cost (work required and risk) of stealing a few pennies is equal the cost of stealing millions, and that cost is minuscule, there is little reason to be specific in targeting.

    Online crime to date has a high return low risk profile.

    Haven't seen it yet, but I expect to see financial raids which remove only pennies from a randomly selected set of accounts--such thefts would be much lower profile, and given the financial industry's huge need for faith in their systems, would be likely to be covered up and absorbed by the institutions.

    I also haven't seen a lot of physical theft by computer, though redirecting shipments could easily permit the theft of massive amounts of material. Such redirections could be presold and would effectively act as a drop shipment.

    Since such attacks could be written to create the modified data only on the bill of lading,which keeping the original system thinking that the shipment went as ordered, such thefts would be undiscovered until they failed to reach their proper destination.

    Given the high rewards of being a black hat vs.the treatment and pay of talented programmers, the wonder is that more of us haven't gone over to the Dark Side.

    Of course, automation has brought us to the point where actual knowledge is not required--it can be purchased or stolen pre-programmed. So even stupid people can commit major online crimes.
    ZDNet Gravatar
    wizoddg
    2nd Feb 2011
  • RE: The current state of the crimeware threat - Q&A
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    ZDNet Gravatar
    efsane
    9th Apr

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