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The FAA Advanced Automation System
The Federal Aviation Administration's Advanced Automation System (AAS) project was supposed to provide a complete overhaul of the nation's major air traffic control computer systems: new tools and displays for controllers to improved communication equipment and a revamped core computer network. In the end, the FAA decided that $1.5 billion worth of hardware and software out of the $2.6 billion spent was useless.
The testimony of a GAO official before Congress in 1994 makes clear that it was bad management which caused all the problems:
AAS's cost and schedule problems have resulted from several technical and managerial factors. First, FAA and IBM's development and implementation plan, including cost and schedule estimates, was overly ambitious given the highly demanding requirements and the complex software architecture for this system. Second, FAA did not provide adequate oversight of IBM's performance, especially during the initial development of the key ISSS component. As a result, IBM's lack of progress did not always surface in a timely manner. Third, FAA was indecisive in resolving some issues about basic requirements, such as the format of new electronic flight data strips to be used by controllers. In our opinion, the above factors — not inadequate funding or federal procurement rules, as contended by some proponents of an air traffic control corporation-- have caused the AAS’s problems.
AAS is another in a long line of projects that underscore what IT is up against in trying to work in government: The procurement process took far too long and was far too political. The new system was supposed to be magically powerful compared to the old one, so expectations for it ran out of control. It also seems that IBM was as unrealistic in the design as anyone and didn't execute well.
NHS Connecting For Health
NHS Connecting for Health, launched in 2002, was supposed to "...[deliver] the NHS National Programme for IT (NPfIT), an initiative by the Department of Health in England to move the National Health Service (NHS) in England towards a single, centrally-mandated electronic care record for patients and to connect 30,000 General practitioners to 300 hospitals, providing secure and audited access to these records by authorized health professionals."
Sounds ambitious and wouldn't it be cool if it worked! It didn't. Go to the Connecting For Health web site and you see a big banner at the top that says "NHS Connecting for Health ceased to exist on 31st March 2013. This website is therefore not being updated." It refers users to a different site.
The BBC reported that "[a] report by the influential Public Accounts Committee (PAC) concluded an attempt to upgrade NHS computer systems in England ended up becoming one of the "worst and most expensive contracting fiascos" in public sector history." The most recent estimate of money wasted is £9.8bn, but even that doesn't account for everything.
- Déjà Vu All Over Again: California's DMV IT Project Canceled — The state of California's Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) is 0 for 2 now on IT modernization projects. In 1994 it canceled a project begun in 1987 after spending $44 million. Earlier this year, six years and $134 million into a second go at it, the state canceled it too. Doesn't anyone in California know anything about computers?
- SAM.gov - The System for Award Management — SAM, which is designed to integrate three acquisition data systems that store and make available information about contractors, went online in July 2012 and was taken off-line days later due to performance issues. It's up and running, but some claim it's still not running right.
- Federal Protective Service Risk Assessment and Management Program (RAMP) — program useless, massive cost overruns - The Department of Homeland Security (DHS)'s Federal Protective Service (FPS) Risk Assessment and Management Program (RAMP) — Enough Acronyms For You? (EAFU?) — is designed to facilitate the FPS's mission of securing Federal facilities and ensuring occupant and visitor safety. A report by DHS's CIO says that "RAMP’s development and deployment has been delayed for two years, and its Life Cycle Cost Estimate (LCCE) has grown from an initial estimate of $15.9M in 2008 to $183M in draft 2011 LCCE. RAMP’s LCCE growth is attributable to poor initial estimates, scope increases, reprioritization of capabilities, unplanned fixes to technical issues, and extended system lifespan."