Guest editorial by Michal Zalewski
You can tell when a person is desperate to appear authoritative: they often litter their speech with unnecessary, roundabout verbiage. To some listeners, this sounds smart. To many others, it's obtuse and pompous.
I think that one of the cornerstones of vulnerability management is just an example of that. I am talking about the concept of vulnerability severities: I believe that they serve no real purpose, other than obfuscating the true intent of speech.
It's not that we don't need a codified taxonomy; but the term "severity" and the abstract levels attached to it ("critical", "high", "medium", "low") are a remarkably poor proxy for what we actually want to say.
- In a position of authority: For example, when an internal security team is communicating with developers. In this case, the intent of assigning severity is to instruct the developer to do one of the following:
- Drop all other work and fix the bug now.
- Fix the issue in a couple of days.
- Fix at own leisure, or not at all.
- In an advisory position: Say, when a vendor is notifying end users about the availability of a fix. In this case, the actual message usually is any of the following:
- You are in imminent danger. Patch now.
- You are at a limited risk, but prompt action is advisable.
- We don't think there is a substantial risk.
Every time, the messages are very simple. Yet, instead of just saying it out loud, we create one set of guidelines for the security team to map their assessment to an ambiguous codeword; and then furnish a second lengthy phrasebook for the final recipient of a message, to map the codeword to something they can act on.
Only we're not running a numbers station: we're trying to tell people something very important, and we need them to understand us right away. There is no way around the fact that terms such as "critical" or "high" intuitively mean different things to different people, and almost certainly not just the thing you actually wanted to say. If the severity needs to be accompanied with several pages of organization-specific explanatory text, something is horribly wrong.
Instead of "highly critical", just start telling your users "patch right away".
* Michal Zalewski is a security researcher at Google. He has written and released many security tools, including ratproxy, skipfish and the browser security handbook. His latest book "The Tangled Web" is now available for sale. Zalewski can be found at the lcamtuf’s blog and on Twitter.