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Dear Microsoft: Please get UAC right this time

By | May 29, 2008, 1:22pm PDT

Summary: The trouble with UAC isn’t a single request for permission. Instead, what bothers most people is the second UAC prompt, and the third, and the fourth, and so on. was all prepared to lay out my modest proposal for how Microsoft should tweak UAC in Windows 7. And then I said, “Hey, wait a minute! I already did this.” My four suggestions for easing the pain of UAC fell on deaf ears when I first published them more than two years ago. Maybe someone in Redmond is more willing to listen today.

Alex Eckelberry of Sunbelt Software vents, intelligently, about Windows Vista’s UAC conundrum:

UAC could certainly have been handled better. It does something the security industry has been well aware of for a long time — it creates the “cry wolf” problem of popup fatigue (people turn off or ignore the popups after awhile). Vista is more secure than XP, despite what others might say, but it still gets infected. Since over 80% of all infections are based on social engineering, the popups should focus on that weak point. If UAC targeted the key areas where people run into trouble (as opposed to harassing the user on inane actions), it would be far more helpful and potentially make a really significant impact on infection rates.

Absolutely right. A single request for permission doesn’t bother most people. What gets under the skin is the second UAC prompt, and the third, and the fourth, and so on. The closer together those dialog boxes arrive, the more annoying the phenomenon.

I was all prepared to lay out my modest proposal for how Microsoft should tweak UAC in Windows 7. And then I said, “Hey, wait a minute! I already did this.”

And sure enough, with a little help from Google I was able to reread “How Microsoft can save User Account Control.” which I wrote way back in May 2006, while Vista was still in beta. In that post, I offered four “suggestions that might ease the pain” of UAC. Two years later, I think those recommendations are still valid, so I’m reprinting them here, with a little updated commentary on each one:

Create a special Admin Mode. Power users would appreciate a UAC option that lets an administrator respond to a single prompt and temporarily open a session that runs with full administrative permissions. The devil is in the details, of course. How do you keep people from choosing this option as the default?

I sure hope someone at Microsoft has been actively working on a way to implement this type of behavior, which I like to think of as Advance Consent mode. In Vista as it exists today, I can do this by switching into silent consent mode (as I describe in Fixing Windows Vista, Part 2: Taming UAC), but that setting is persistent, in the current session and in future sessions. If I forget to switch UAC back to its normal behavior, I’ve made myself more vulnerable to a variety of attacks. The default settings could exit Advance Consent mode after a specified time - say, 15 minutes -  in which I take no activity that would have required UAC approval.

Put a time limit on UAC. [E]ach UAC prompt is tied to a single process. When that process ends, so does the elevated set of permissions. But what if a UAC consent dialog box elevated your permissions for 10 minutes? Long enough to install a couple of programs or make a series of system tweaks, but not so long that you forget and fall victim to a piece of malware.

I think this should be an option in every UAC dialog box. It can be hidden, just as the Options section of IE7’s Close dialog box is hidden by default. Give me a check box that says “Automatically approve elevation requests for the next 10 minutes.” That way, I get to approve the first UAC dialog box and then don’t have to worry about a flurry of additional, related UAC prompts.

Provide easy options to open Control Panel and/or Explorer with full Admin rights. As I indicated earlier, it takes only a right-click and a quick OK to open either of these windows with full permissions. So why not offer those options on the Start menu?

This is an especially important change to make for Control Panel. If I open Control Panel and double-click an icon with the UAC shield, that consent should transfer to any other action I execute from Control Panel, until I close the Control Panel window. This feature might work especially well in tandem with the next suggestion.

Identify applications running in an elevated context. Today, if I open two Windows Explorer sessions – one as a standard user and another using an administrator’s process token – I have no way to distinguish which is which. A text label in the title bar, or a blood-red border around the window, would help prevent this convenient shortcut from becoming a security hole.

For Command Prompt sessions, this was addressed (too subtly, in my opinion) in Vista RTM. When you run Cmd.exe as an Administrator, the word “Administrator:” appears in front of the window title in the title bar. I still like the idea of the blood-red border.

As I noted in that original May 2006 post, “Microsoft has to deal decisively with the perception that UAC imposes an unacceptable tradeoff between performance and security. In its current incarnation, too many people are likely to dismiss it completely, and if that happens, everyone loses.”

That plea fell on deaf ears two years ago. Maybe, after more than a year of user complaints and frustration, someone is finally ready to listen.

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Ed Bott is an award-winning technology writer with more than two decades' experience writing for mainstream media outlets and online publications.

Disclosure

Ed Bott

Ed Bott is a freelance technical journalist and book author. All work that Ed does is on a contractual basis.

Since 1994, Ed has written more than 25 books about Microsoft Windows and Office. Along with various co-authors, Ed is completely responsible for the content of the books he writes. As a key part of his contractual relationship with publishers, he gives them permission to print and distribute the content he writes and to pay him a royalty based on the actual sales of those books. Ed's books written prior to fall 2011 have been distributed by Que Publishing (a division of Pearson Education) and by Microsoft Press. As of November 2011, Ed is a partner in the independent publishing company Fair Trade Digital Exchange, which exclusively publishes his books.

On occasion, Ed accepts consulting assignments. In recent years, he has worked as an expert witness in cases where his experience and knowledge of Microsoft and Microsoft Windows have been useful. In each such case, his compensation is on an hourly basis, and he is hired as a witness, not an advocate.

Ed does not own stock or have any other financial interest in Microsoft or any other software company. He owns 500 shares of stock in EMC Corporation, which was purchased before the company's acquisition of VMware. In addition, he owns 350 shares of stock in Intel Corporation, purchased more than two years ago. All stocks are held in retirement accounts for long-term growth.

Ed does not accept gifts from companies he covers. All hardware products he writes about are purchased with his own funds or are review units covered under formal loan agreements and are returned after the review is complete.

Biography

Ed Bott

Ed Bott is an award-winning technology writer with more than two decades' experience writing for mainstream media outlets and online publications. He's served as editor of the U.S. edition of PC Computing and managing editor of PC World; both publications had monthly paid circulation in excess of 1 million during his tenure. He is the author of more than 25 books on Microsoft Windows and Office, including the recently released Windows 7 Inside Out.

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RE: Dear Microsoft: Please get UAC right this time
beijing2008 14th Sep
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Simpler idea
spark555 29th May 2008
The problem with UAC is not really how it works to protect potentially vulnerable areas of the OS, it's that tons of applications NEED to do potentially OS-threatening things in order to work as an everyday course of business.

If an app wants to remember a little bit of info for itself, or query something, it should be possible for that to happen without having access to the entire windows registry, the entire disk drive, etc.

Admin privs should NOT be needed dozens of times per day. That's the problem.
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Contributr
I don't have a single app that prompts me for UAC consent during normal operation. The only time I see an app-related UAC dialog is when a system utility (defragger, AV scanner, etc.) wants to do something that involves system access.

If you're seeing UAC prompts "dozens of times a day," then that app needs to be looked at. Are you talking about a specific piece of software?
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and may not be ever. You are always going to have people resistent to migrating to Vista because of these programs. UAC has put up a strong case for stopping people moving in it's current implementation. As you say in the article, there are ways to make it less obtrusive without compromising the whole idea of it.

Personally, I disable UAC because it actually totally prevents me from doing certain actions at all! For example, rearranging my start menu where shortcuts are in the ALL USERS profile. Not even privilege elevation allows you to move them (at least not pre-SP1). For someone with local admin privileges that to me is totally inexcusable.
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Contributr
I didn't say written for Vista
Ed Bott 29th May 2008
Any app written using 6-year-old guidelines for XP should work perfectly under Vista.
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you should learn what permissions are
qmlscycrajg 29th May 2008
if a file is marked as "ALL USERS", then you can't delete it without administrative privileges. This is the same in linux, you can delete only your files, not files of other users.
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Don't think that's the reason...
cgdams 30th May 2008
You can make changes to the ALL USERS start menu. UAC prompts for elevation before you do it, as it's supposed to do, but you can.

I'm suspecting open handles to the folder or some file inside that caused the problem, not UAC.
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If you have privilege elevation
SamCPP 31st Jul 2008
you should be able to do whatever you want with non-system files. And I think shortcuts to programs should be included in that.
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Hmmm - seems to work for me...
cgdams 30th May 2008
Just for curiosity, i tried to change to the ALL USERS start menu. Sure enough, you get two UAC messages for every change, where one certainly would suffice, but it works fine.

My machine has Vista SP1, but i think it also worked before SP1. Are you sure that it was UAC that prevented your changes? Because, in the beginning, i also seemed to have a UAC problem which wasn't one, after all. The scenario was like that: i tried to change a folder name that i needed administrator rights for. The UAC message popped up, i confirmed, but the UAC message popped up again and again, and the folder wasn't renamed. The reason, as it turned out some minutes later, was that there was a hidden explorer windows showing the contents of that folder, and that would prevent the rename, so a log off and log on solved my problem that i thought UAC was responsible for.

oh, and btw: do you still reorganize your start menu? I used to do that a lot under XP, because that was your only chance to find anything there, but under Vista, i don't even open the start menu any more, but use start menu search all the time instead. I've found the typing exc is a much faster way to start Excel than doing it XP-style by opening, searching and clicking the start menu.
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I may try the search
SamCPP 31st Jul 2008
but as for the UAC problem, I am running on a machine in a domain at work - perhaps the domain and UAC are the difference that is causing the problem. I will retry with UAC enabled and see if it is still a problem for me (I am running Vista Business w/ SP1).
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UAC's file and registry virtualization already dooes it. When a program is trying to write in a system location (file system or registry), the write is redirected to the users folder.
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What is wrong with switching to an admin account or "run as administrator" option and then switching back? If a user wants to be the driver in the car he/she has to get driver license, push the pedals, use the weel, look in the mirrors, talk to policemen, and do all other wonderful stuff. Otherwise, move to the passanger seat and enjoy the ride.
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Locks on houses ae so inconvenient.
CobraA1 29th May 2008
Oh nothing, except they often stay there. XP tried that approach, and it failed miserably. Everybody just stayed in their Admin account.

Don't worry about that stranger in your house you let in while you were away. After all, locks are so inconvenient.
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Is anyone home?
klumper 29th May 2008
It's more than obvious UAC has room for vast improvement. But, as is often the case, is anyone listening? Hello MS, is anyone home?

The more Microsoft tries to steer and micro-manage its user base, by replacing multi-choice options with singular (and often dumbed down) defaults, the more it peeves me. You see these deficits and shortcomings all across their GUI, and how often do you find yourself asking: "Why couldn't they have included an additional choice or two in this dialog prompt?" It's not like they lack the brainpower at Redmond to accomplish these kinds of things.

In the same way MS prefers to peddle their flagship OS packages to the OEM vendors to promote new machine purchases, and thus relegates DIY warriors to second class status by overcharging for retail offerings, I often times feel they would prefer power users and enthusiasts to just go away so they can be left to baby-sit their dumbed down charges - charging as they go of course. "Simply Dial 1-800-MSFTSOS, and you're as good as gold!" Nothing like a bunch of tame and blind lemmings to call your own.

Ironically it is the power user/enthusiast class that generally sets the tone in most things computing and not the masses, by creating both the challenges to be met, and suggestions and critiques on how they're best fulfilled.

Choice is good Microsoft. Remember that. Please.
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Let's see... umm... most Active-X controls, most exe's that don't happen to be on the C drive, NOD32, ccleaner, administering automatic updates, uninstalling anything, simply opening device manager to look at it, turning off or altering file sharing, daring to even look at the event viewer, creating a folder an assorted places...

Many of these things might be worthy of ONE double-check from the OS. Alas, most of them nag repeatedly - as many as 4 times just to create an empty folder (now that's dangerous!).

And since there is no trusted-app feature in UAC, the presence of just one app or activity that you do frequently results in endless nags and thus causes the user to either turn off UAC or auto-click-ok to the nags, leaving the machine open to social engineering attacks.
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What are you talking about?
wolf_z 30th May 2008
1) I use Vista daily, in the NON-administrator mode.

2) What application do you run that requires privilege elevation?

3) I haven't seen a UAC prompt except when:

A) Installing/uninstalling a program (where it should appear)

B) Running Task Manager and trying to view/kill system level processes (ditto)

C) Running admin level tools (defrag, etc). (You want non-admins running this stuff?)

If you're seeing UAC prompts while running a simple application it means the application violates *XP* guidelines. Personally, I haven't seen such an app in months--most companies have issued patches/updates to run apps correctly in Vista.

Oh, and that double-click non-sense? Doesn't work in an Active Directory environment. We disable the local admin account and use a domain admin instead. Doing that requires you supply both the admin account name and the password--which is how UAC *should* behave. happy
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UAC time delay
jb3d 29th May 2008
Your suggestion that MS should put a time limit on UAC will leave a gaping hole in the security. Malware that was executed with standard user rights and that wants to gain full administrative rights just needs to lurk in the background until the user gives his or her consent to a UAC prompt, and then it can spring into action and install itself in parts of the system that would otherwise be protected.
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If it is too painful then people won't use it at all.

That said, I personally don't agree with you in your logic. If malware is "lurking in the background" you are already compromised and theoretically as soon as you elevate privileges it could strike. Yes, damage might be more limited but once the crook is in the house it is time to call the cops and get him out.
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would be retroactive for previously launched processes.
It doesn't have to work that way.
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That's not a real issue.
DannyO_0x98 30th May 2008
I think this goes in the "can't happen" file, which is rather
roundish.

Let's assume that a key logger was not maliciously installed
on the system. Processes cannot just peer into other
processes and siphon off permissions. Not in Windows, not
in Linux, not in OS X, not in... not in any competent
operating system released this decade and some which
have been around since the 70s.

Everyone other than Microsoft uses sudo which does allow
a limited time for uses without password re-entry within
the same process (think opening a terminal.) If one needs
more time, one could sudo /bin/bash and operate as root
until entering exit.

I'm surprised runas/UAC doesn't seem to provide for this
(unless I read Mr. Bott's comments incorrectly.)
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There are some programs that require admin rights for extended periods such as disk defragmenting programs or other long running processes. Imposing a time limit on such a utility could be fatal to the computer.
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Contributr
You miss the point
Ed Bott 6th Jun 2008
When a process is started, it gets a token that defines its permissions. That token persists as long as the process continues to run.

The time limit idea refers to the launching of NEW processes from the shell or Control Panel.
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Additional high level concept: Figure out how to distinguish between _user_ initiated actions, and rogue programs initiating them.

If I wanna open the event viewer, don't nag me.

If some previously unknown piece of software wants to edit the registry, that'd be a good time to ask about it. Once.
Figure out how to distinguish between _user_ initiated actions, and rogue programs initiating them.

Easy to say. Now turn it into something that can be implemented.
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Some actions are extremely difficult to distinguish. You only need one action to be "forged" by a rogue program for your proposal to be absolutely meaningless.
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Emulate Unix sudo
D T Schmitz 29th May 2008
Linux/Unix/BSD allow 'sudoers'. Administrative rights can be 'delegated' to specific users/groups for specific tasks (see man pages for sudo).

Microsoft should be able to emulate this.
...of Windows users?

But if you really want sudo type functionality in Windows then write a sudo type program. Nothings stopping anyone.
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But that's not good enough...
bmerc 30th May 2008
The functionality needs to be built in and available by default when the OS is installed, or else it will not be used by most.
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sudo rests on top of the OS.
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Unix sudo is unsafe
qmlscycrajg 29th May 2008
Unix sudo is unsafe. If you allow a program permanently, then a malware will use it
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You don't have a clue, do you?
n0neXn0ne 31st May 2008
One useful feature of sudo is its "time ticketing" system. When a user invokes sudo and enters their password, they are granted a ticket for 5 minutes (this timeout is configurable at compile-time). Each subsequent sudo command updates the ticket for another 5 minutes.
If I perform the following:

sudo su -

Subsequent issuances of that command do not prompt for a password (assuming the 5 minutes has passed or that I have not invalidated it with the -k option)

Again: security=1/convinence
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when ...
n0neXn0ne 1st Jun 2008
You reach and grab you get elbowed. wink
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RE: Emulate Unix sudo (RBAC)
n0neXn0ne 30th May 2008
Solaris 10 Role Based Access Control (RBAC)

The problem with the traditional model is not just that root (superuser) is so powerful, but that a regular user accounts are not powerful enough to fix their own problems.

There were some limited attempts to address this problem in Unix in the past (wheel group and immutable file attributes in BSD, sudo, extended attributes (ACL), etc), but Role Based Access Control (RBAC) as implemented in Solaris 10 is probably the most constructive way to address this complex problem in its entirety.
It opens up the possibility that malware can sneak in. And let me head off the responses stating it's unlikely to happen how many times has Microsoft said that about a vulnerability only to have it become compromised.

Everyone was screaming for Microsoft to secure their OS. They've done it. Now everyone is screaming that it's bothersome. Here's reality:

security=1/convenience

Increase one and you decrease the other. As has already been mentioned the correct solution is for application developers to fix their applications.
I'm not sure that it really opens the door to malware to sneek in. Malware has already gotten in. UAC limits the damage it can do. And in reality this would happen without the users knowledge.

Writing better apps won't solve the UAC problem. Microsoft generates more UACs than apps. If you are already infected then raising privileges at any point even just once is dangerous, caching makes it a bit worse, that's all. But if doing UAC is fairly rare then the malware is blocked during all the other time.

You have to strike a balance and I think caching is normative for most all other OSes. It is good enough.
...Microsoft shouldn't have done it because it opens up a back door. Again people were whining and crying for Microsoft to secure Windows. They have. Now people are whining and crying that it's too much. I agree that security is a balancing act. But with the sheer volume of malware targeting Windows I think erring on the side of caution is warranted.

And yes writing applications to work with LUP will help the UAC issue. I am puzzled by the complaints by people seeing UAC too much. The only time I see it is when I make a system change. And since that's a rare event it's a non-issue when I see it. So if people are seeing UAC a lot it's the result of the programs they're using.
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Drop other OS examples like linux, unix and OS X and then they have to shut up.

You really have to use-cases and I've tried to think through a number of use-cases and in my estimation the risk falls well below other attack surfaces.

First, UAC doesn't protect against malware getting on the system, it limits what the malware can do once it is there. At some point the malware needs removal. If it doesn't get removed eventually even the single use UAC will compromise the system. For example if I use control panel and elevate privileges as long as I don't terminate what I am doing, that instance remains elevated, during which malware can do thousands of things - assuming it can get access to the privilege elevated process - which assumes it has already had access to some root level api.

Hmm, that's got me thinking, UAC should never elevate privileges system wide but only for the selected process. In this case UAC could only cache if the same process requires UAC elevation multiple times.

I wonder if sudo elevates privileges system wide. I think not because you sudo for a particular app...
Hmm, thinking...
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The elevation applies only to the process being elevated and only for the duration or the processes life (a wise move IMO).

And you're right. UAC does nothing to prevent malware from getting on the system. What UAC does it block malware from obtaining administrative rights which allow it to burrow itself into the configuration of the OS. If malware gets on the system in a user context the damage is minimized (though data is the most valuable part of any computer system). Cleaning it up is immensly easier.
but once i unlock the house and go in i don't have to unlock each room every time i try to enter.
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Some thoughts.
TripleII-21189418044173169409978279405827 29th May 2008
Instalation, like in most Linux distros, it opens a GUI control panel after prompting for root where the user installs. You can't run any program from there, you can only install. It would not be hard for MS to enforce that ALL installations go through this GUI. You double click on any .exe, it opens the "Installer Admin GUI". First thing it does, it prompts, when from inside this GUI, you do ALL the install with no more prompts.

The same would work if, like Linux, they integrated ALL system configuration into a single, one stop shopping system like Mandrake Control Center, Once you enter admin password for this GUI, it never prompts again. You enforce that ALL software that installs anything that needs admin's control adds an item to this GUI, like a VPN config client, etc.

Without the *nix way of imbedding rwx into every single file (that's how KDESU, etc knows you need to be root), the above at least mitigates the problem.

It also eliminates the 900 disparate hard to find GUI, subgui, sub-subgui changes in Vista. One stop shopping. Not only that, they could add extra protection along the lines of.

"WARNING, this program is attempting to open a firewall port #33000. This is a common form of trojan action, are you SURE you want to continue?"

"WARNING, this program is attempting to write to critical system resource ABC. Unless you absolutely know the source of executable and trust the vendor, this is a common malware infection method".

Warnings could be mitigated with an MS controlled database. Windows can perform an MD5 sum, and if it matches the MD5 sum the vendor registered in an MS central database, no extra warnings occur, if the sig is no present, or offline, etc, the warnings are presented.

Something along those lines. I am sure that the wizbang screensaver the person wants to install doesn't need to rewrite critical files.

TripleII
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Forgot backward compatibility part.
TripleII-21189418044173169409978279405827 29th May 2008
For Windows 7, if it is written for Windows 7, MS gets to make the rules, flat out, do it this way or go away. Since backward compatibility, imho, should be accomplished with streamlined, invisible to the user VMs (inlclude an XP VM, a Vista VM) for legacy, but moving forward, literally, they write using MS's new rules. That eliminates the Quicken laziness dilemna, if they want to sell a Windows 7 version, no backward compatibility loopholes, anything certified as Windows 7 follows the new install rules.

TripleII
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...the certification route since Windows 2000. And it doesn't appear to have helped one bit.
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Yes, it does, if they want it to.
TripleII-21189418044173169409978279405827 29th May 2008
If MS can't make a kernel trap so the controlling GUI process is not invoked for ANY installation executable, they aren't trying very hard. grin

If they want to write for Windows 7, and they need to have the user occasionally need to configure a system setting (again, the VPN example), then they write to register the app in the "One Stop Shopping" control panel, otherwise, they don't get to put written for Windows 7.

It's the same for Linux, RPMs for example, Signatures are present, they have to follow the rules for the distro or installation fails.

They can continue with the Vista way, or XP way and it installs into a VM, but moving forward, if they want to put Optimized for Windows 7 on the box, they follow the new rules.

The added bonus is simply that the controlling install GUI can monitor what any instalation program is actually doing, and look for suspicious behavior. Who better than MS to know what are "red flag" behaviors, again, barring the new optional MD5 database check.

Since 100% of all installs MUST, again, the low level kernel trap for all installs, enter admin password, drive by installs are absolutely eliminated. Any installed executable that wants to write to any system directory (i.e. run as the user) simply fails, nobody writes to any system directory unless it goes through the GUI.

TripleII
...proven futile in the past. Microsoft has a certification process in place already and it has done little to pursuade developers to write their software correctly. Which is puzzling because the requirements are just good coding practices that developers should be following anyway.
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We aren't communicating.
TripleII-21189418044173169409978279405827 29th May 2008
If they don't follow the new rules, the software doesn't work. After install (again, the install is seamless to the installer, it doesn't know it is actually being invoked from the Installer GUI), if there is no way for a person to upgrade, or configure the VPN, or activate the firewall or whatever, they WILL complain to the vendor.

That's what written for Windows 7 means, and if they don't follow the rules MS enforces, too bad so sad. They will though, it isn't onerous, it isn't radical. Quicken was not modified, as many others weren't because of laziness.

Do you really think that Photoshop isn't going to follow the rules to make a product that works natively on Windows 7 by the rules MS makes? MS needs to give 12 months minimum on what the "backend system config" rules and MD5Sum (or whatever) submission process is, but again, that's not onerous.

Using the Linux example, I can cry in my soup till the cows come home, but unless my software is going to work, and it has to be written to system directories, I have to follow the filesystem rules, or go home.

TripleII
...how program x, y, or z isn't working with Vista right now. And you're proposing Microsoft break it even more? Sorry but I don't feel that's a realistic option.

Look, no matter what security mdeol Microsoft puts into place these people are going to continue becoming infected. The current security model is fine given the end user exercises a little common sense. There is no technical answer to this non-technical problem.
This is actually one case where I support MS playing hard ball with the rest of the community. But it's all in how they go about implementing the plan. MS's number one problem with Vista is not their security model or the quality of the code, it's their lack of proper communication with end users on why things don't work the way they expect.

MS doesn't tell you that a bad driver is slowing down your system (although a recent article says they are working on such a tool, so good for them). MS doesn't tell you that the reason you get a dozen UAC popups whenever you run XYZ program is because XYZ doesn't follow proper security models. So because MS doesn't say that, the end user is left to assume that the OS is the problem, not the program. This is what TripleII is suggesting they do at installation time (rather than after the program is already installed), that it does not allow the program to install AND that it explains to the end user exactly why it won't allow it to install, that it is a program issue and not an OS issue. The second part is just as important as the first part, and it's that second part that MS has neglected to do, which is why they are the ones getting all the backlash.

Now certainly even after MS explains to the user what the problem is there will be certain individuals who will blast MS anyway, because that's what they do. Well MS needs to develop thicker skin against that, they need to be the ones to take the high road here. It'll be tough, but if they think long term benefits rather than short term headaches (which is something they HAVEN'T been doing well until Vista, and even now I fear they'll backtrack) they'll see it's the right thing to do.
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...
Linux User 147560 30th May 2008
Microsoft won't break backwards compatibility for two reasons:

1. That would be all that is needed to allow people to move to Linux or Mac. Once their software no longer works on the new iteration of Windows, the option to move to a new platform will seem more fiscally viable.

2. Customers will dig their heels in and really not adopt the new system. Thereby staying with an old system and demanding support for it.

They should have broke backwards compatibility with Vista and forced application vendors to their new OS security model standards. They had a chance but... now it's gone. With both Linux and Macintosh getting better and stronger, Microsoft is facing some tough times ahead. devil

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ie8 fix
ie8 fix