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Tracking down those XP crashes: Could the cause be malware?

By | February 12, 2010, 9:59am PST

Summary: According to reports on some newsgroups, a Windows patch is causing the Blue Screen of Death for Windows XP users. Microsoft has temporarily withdrawn the update while it investigates the reports. Before you leap to conclusions about the coding skills of Microsoft’s developers, you might want to consider the possibility that this problem is related to undetected malware infections. I’ve got some exclusive details.

Update 3-Mar 2:00PM PST: Microsoft has re-released the MS10-015 update with new detection logic that blocks it from installingon computers that are infected with the malware that caues these crashes. They have also released a standalone FixIt tool to detect potential compatibility issues.

Update 12-Feb 11AM PST: The Microsoft Security Response Center, in a new blog post published 25 minutes after I published this post, acknowledged that the issues identified here are real: “In our continuing investigation in to the restart issues related to MS10-015 that a limited number of customers are experiencing, we have determined that malware on the system can cause the behavior. We are not yet ruling out other potential causes at this time and are still investigating.”

It’s also worth noting in that blog post that Microsoft support engineers have actually “driven to customer locations and picked up affected systems” to get the crash dumps they needed.

Based on some posts in newsgroups, several news outlets have reported that a Windows patch was causing the Blue Screen of Death for Windows XP users. As my colleague Mary Jo Foley noted yesterday,  Microsoft has temporarily withdrawn update MS10-015 (KB977165) while it investigates the reports.

That is a reasonable response, but before you Windows-haters leap to conclusions about the coding skills of Microsoft’s developers, you might want to consider an alternate possibility. Based on some third-party reports I’ve read, the problem might be related to undetected malware infections.

A blog post by Patrick W. Barnes (which in turn follows up on some information originally posted in comments at the Microsoft-run Windows Update forum and at the SANS Internet Storm Center) contains these details:

One of Microsoft’s “Patch Tuesday” security fixes is triggering a widespread “Blue Screen of Death” problem.  The cause is not the update itself, but an existing infection.  So far, reports suggest that this problem affects Windows XP and Windows Vista.

[…]

I have found that the root cause is an infection of %System32\drivers\atapi.sys, and that replacing this file with a clean version will get the system booting normally.

More details after the jump.

For those who don’t know Windows kernel drivers, Atapi.sys provides access to the system hard drive. If it’s damaged or if it doesn’t match the hardware in your system, the result will be a STOP error, which displays 0×0000007B INACCESSIBLE_BOOT_DEVICE (or a similar error code) on a blue screen.

The MS10-015 update does not replace the Atapi.sys driver, but it does replace a bunch of kernel files that interact with that driver (the full list is in the KB article, under the File Information heading), so it’s not unexpected that these changes would cause problems on systems that were already infected.

I found an unrelated report with similar details in a thread at bleepingcomputer.com, where a user reported experiencing this issue and provided diagnostic reports showing infections by several rootkits and Trojan-horse programs (Rootkit.Win32.Agent and Backdoor.Tidserv, also known as TDDS), as well as the Koobface worm. One detail that caught my eye in that thread was the name of that Tidserv nasty, which is known to replace Atapi.sys with an infected version. (See this search for a sample of reports.)

Going through those reports suggests this isn’t a new rootkit or a new problem. A November 2009 report at Computing.net sounds awfully similar:

I just had an XP PC that was in a constant loop on start-up. It wouldn’t even let me do a repair install no matter how I set up the boot order. […] Avast found the TDDS rootkit in the MBR and lots of other malware in the USB drive….

And this one, from Norton’s community forums in December 2009:

I was fooled into running an executable … I was suspicious so immediately ran a full scan overnight. The scan reported 1 threat and needed to reboot to complete the fix. I let it reboot. The computer failed to boot, with a blue screen and a Stop message (code 7B hex). Safe mode would also not reboot – same blue screen. Selecting “reboot using last safe settings” did boot. I checked the Norton log. The scan found one virus – Backdoor.Tidserv.l!inf, which it claimed to have resolved. However auto-protect also reported finding the same virus a bit later, again claiming to have resolved it. Rebooting again resulted in the same blue screen, this time in all types of boot, including last safe settings. I’m now unable to boot at all.

Later in the thread, a forum veteran describes a report from a similar infection, complete with blue screen.

Nothing I have seen suggests this is truly a widespread problem. Given that several hundred million people have downloaded this update, even a tiny fraction of a percent would result in thousands of affected systems.

So should you hold off on installing this update? Given that the issue it fixes requires local login rights to exploit and there are no known attacks in the wild, there’s little risk in holding off, at least until Microsoft completes its investigation.

Of course, you could also upgrade to 64-bit Windows 7, which doesn’t require this patch at all.

[Hat tip to Rafael Rivera of Within Windows for pointing me to two of these links.]

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Ed Bott is an award-winning technology writer with more than two decades' experience writing for mainstream media outlets and online publications.

Disclosure

Ed Bott

Ed Bott is a freelance technical journalist and book author. All work that Ed does is on a contractual basis.

Since 1994, Ed has written more than 25 books about Microsoft Windows and Office. Along with various co-authors, Ed is completely responsible for the content of the books he writes. As a key part of his contractual relationship with publishers, he gives them permission to print and distribute the content he writes and to pay him a royalty based on the actual sales of those books. Ed's books written prior to fall 2011 have been distributed by Que Publishing (a division of Pearson Education) and by Microsoft Press. As of November 2011, Ed is a partner in the independent publishing company Fair Trade Digital Exchange, which exclusively publishes his books.

On occasion, Ed accepts consulting assignments. In recent years, he has worked as an expert witness in cases where his experience and knowledge of Microsoft and Microsoft Windows have been useful. In each such case, his compensation is on an hourly basis, and he is hired as a witness, not an advocate.

Ed does not own stock or have any other financial interest in Microsoft or any other software company. He owns 500 shares of stock in EMC Corporation, which was purchased before the company's acquisition of VMware. In addition, he owns 350 shares of stock in Intel Corporation, purchased more than two years ago. All stocks are held in retirement accounts for long-term growth.

Ed does not accept gifts from companies he covers. All hardware products he writes about are purchased with his own funds or are review units covered under formal loan agreements and are returned after the review is complete.

Biography

Ed Bott

Ed Bott is an award-winning technology writer with more than two decades' experience writing for mainstream media outlets and online publications. He's served as editor of the U.S. edition of PC Computing and managing editor of PC World; both publications had monthly paid circulation in excess of 1 million during his tenure. He is the author of more than 25 books on Microsoft Windows and Office, including the recently released Windows 7 Inside Out.

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RE: Tracking down those XP crashes: Could the cause be malware?
RICHMONFT 30th Sep
Fantastic news about the new release.I positively enjoying each little bit of it and I have you b o o k m a r k e d to check out new stuff you weblog post.Im not sure i come to an agreement with you on every level, howevor it absolutely was a good posting, many thanks for taking the time to put up your ideas
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just fixed one, probably had virus
eggmanbubbagee@... Updated - 12th Feb 2010
had to use the recovery console to run the fix which uninstalls the update and this worked, the endless reboots stopped and we were back in XP. But upon enterering XP I discovered some virus-type activity including a mysterious pop-up offering to 'fix the problem' and lots of other error messages. So we decided to retire this very old machine instead of wasting any further time. Will run malwarebytes on it when I get another chance. So far this is the only XP machine I have encountered to have the issue out of many machines.
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Use Combofix to repair this infection
curtis18 Updated - 12th Feb 2010
Combofix will remove the infected atapi.sys file in Windows XP. Takes around 15-20 minutes to run. I have repaired 50- 60 XP machines in the last 3 months with this modified atapi file.
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Contributr
Link would be nice
Ed Bott 12th Feb 2010
I'm sure I can find it at Bleepingcomputer.com but it sounds like you can suggest an authoritative source.
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Link
curtis18 12th Feb 2010
You were right, bleepingcomputer.com is where you can find it. Here is the link with instructions; http://www.bleepingcomputer.com/combofix/how-to-use-combofix
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Contributr
Thanks (nt)
Ed Bott 12th Feb 2010
...
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ComboFix...
NonSuch_z 12th Feb 2010
ComboFix is not a tool that should be used lightly. Its developer would be the first one to caution people that ComboFix should only be used with extreme care and only by those who understand the tool and are experienced in malware removal. It is important to know what to do when things go wrong as they sometimes do.
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You are correct
curtis18 12th Feb 2010
Combofix should not be used by everyone. As stated by other posters you can go in to recovery console and replace the atapi.sys file with one from an XP CD. Make sure you do other malware and virus scans afterward though because I have had the atapi.sys file replaced on me right after I switched it. That is why I recommended Combofix because it fixes this problem plus finds the other pieces to the problem. Here is a write up of the infected atapi.sys - Virus:Win32/Alureon.F http://www.microsoft.com/security/portal/Threat/Encyclopedia/Entry.aspx?Name=Virus%3aWin32%2fAlureon.F
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Auto replaced files are done by Drive Cache, not necessarily a virus.
IF you delete or replace a file in the Windows System [ or System32 folder], and there is a similar file in the driver cache - windows will simply auto load that over the top of what was just replaced or deleted.
In this case you must find that file in the driver cache [or backup folder] and re-name the file extension , and then copy the replacement file to here and the system folder.
- then restart the machine ...
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Thanks
curtis18 13th Feb 2010
I should have mentioned that I do replace both copies of the file (system32/drivers & system32/dllcache).
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Trying to clean a desktop system with XP sp2.

Can't access the internet (passes connectivity tests), or start Norton 360 except in safe mode, can't install previously downloaded IE8, can't access Windows Update, etc.

Norton 360 will run in safe mode, but doesn't find anything (it can't connect to the update server, either).

Running newest version of ClamWin from a USB stick, but not finding anything either.

Anyone know a good cleaner that can run from a USB stick I can try?

May have to do a complete system recovery, but it is on the HD and afraid it may be bad, too. The virus has also deleted ALL system restore points.

Thanks! I don't have any hair left to pull out.
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Try Vipre Rescue
Greenknight_z Updated - 13th Feb 2010
Give the free Vipre Rescue Program a try: http://live.sunbeltsoftware.com/
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Thanks, but ....
babyboomer57 14th Feb 2010
my ISP called me and said they were going to kill my DSL line if I didn't disconnect the machine, it was bombarding their email servers.

I just nuked the drive and started over with it. Luckily the recovery partition was not infected.

I hope she has fun installing all her crap again.
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Much faster method
waltmaine 16th Feb 2010
Using the widely available NT Password Reset CD, you can drop to a linux prompt, mount the hard drive of the affected system, and copy a new version over from another location (the "locate" command can find a copy for you, I found one in \windows\Servicepackfiles on an XP system.)
Total process is about 3 minutes (including the time it takes to boot the CD.)
If it is an infected Atapi.sys file, perhaps Microsoft should install a clean copy of the file in the MS10-015 update. I understand that an infected file is not something that Microsoft should be required to repair, but replacing the file should eliminate any support calls from irate users associating their BSOD with the update that just took place on their computer.

It certainly would be better public relations than reacting to the outcry with "It's not our fault this time."
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Contributr
See the update at top of post
Ed Bott 12th Feb 2010
Interesting suggestion. Might be more appropriate to add that detection/repair code to the Malicious Software Repair Tool and require that it be run before the update is installed.
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That could be problematic...
Wolfie2K3 12th Feb 2010
Not sure, but if the ATAPI.SYS file in XP RTM is different from the one in SP1 or SP2 or SP3, there would have to be several versions of the patch - one for each time the file got changed.

That is, IF, indeed ATAPI.SYS is the real culprit.
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I'm pretty sure this is from malware
Lerianis10 12th Feb 2010
I talked with someone online who was having this issue, and I asked him to make sure after he removed that one update, that the libraries were 'signed'... they were not, he scanned with anti-virus software, it found a bad virus and removed it.

Microsoft needs to make it so that the stuff in the Windows directory can ONLY be added to by known good programs, AND can only be CHANGED by Microsoft programs themselves.
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Contributr
Yes, agreed
Ed Bott 12th Feb 2010
The change you describe was made for Vista and also for Windows 7. UAC makes it much harder for a program to change system files so you see this mostly on XP.
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Yep....
OhTheHumanity 12th Feb 2010
I tell everyone to get off XP. Vista offered much more security alone to be worth the jump. None of my users ever run as admin on their systems. We have very little problem at all with Windows XP. Working on the 7 rollout now.
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Contributr
Do you mean...
Ed Bott 12th Feb 2010
Did you mean to write "We have very little problem with Windows Vista"?
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Yes.....
OhTheHumanity 14th Feb 2010
..
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? Negate Vender specific patches?
madrucke@... 12th Feb 2010
Wouldn't limiting access wholesale negate system specific fixes and patches.

Or, custom files for specific hardware?

Though it is a nice idea. happy
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Malware fix
JeremyBoden 13th Feb 2010
But unfortunately we are looking at a horse / stable door scenario. M$ have always allowed any old crapware to install in the Windows directory.

Loading Linux would cure this bug - permanently!
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Contributr
Uh, no...
Ed Bott 13th Feb 2010
Sheesh. That was true for Windows XP. It is absolutely not true for Vista or Windows 7. (You'll neeed to read up on UAC, and the Trusted Installer account, and user profile redirection). That reliability and security design flaw was fixed more than three years ago. Knowing that, would you like to amend your statement?
That reliability and security design flaw was fixed more than three years ago.

...a member of the Administrators account. Use an account with administrative privileges and Windows XP is about as resistant to malware as Vista and Windows 7. Don't confuse a default configuration with a design flaw.
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Contributr
That was only part of it
Ed Bott Updated - 14th Feb 2010
For an application that was written with the assumption that the user was an admin, there was no easy alternative than to install and run as an admin, with files going into privileged locations in the file system and registry. Vista/7 fixed that with the concept of file and registry virtualization in UAC. So a user with a standard account can install and elevate, and the potentially dangerous files go into the user's profile but appear to the app as if they're in the Windows or System folders. Ditto for the registry.

That alone is a huge change, and there are other, similar changes that make Vista/7 inherently more secure *by design* than XP.
For an application that was written with the assumption that the user was an admin, there was no easy alternative than to install and run as an admin, with files going into privileged locations in the file system and registry.

I understand this. But it's not a flaw in the OS. Otherwise Linux and OS X would be just as flawed as XP.

Vista/7 fixed that with the concept of vile and registry virtualization in UAC. So a user with a standard account can install and elevate, and the potentially dangerous files go into the user's profile but appear to the app as if they're in the Windows or System folders. Ditto for the registry

I'm aware of the steps Vista and Windows 7 take to minimize the impact of poorly written applications. But in the end these features are to work around flawed applications and not a flawed OS.

That alone is a huge change, and there are other, similar changes that make Vista/7 inherently more secure *by design* than XP.

There are a few other things but not running as an administrator is, IMO, one of the most significant ways to minimize your chances of contracting malware. I believe in it so much I've been running this way since Windows NT 3.51 and have experienced zero malware infections. All while not running anti-malware.
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Contributr
Fine
Ed Bott Updated - 14th Feb 2010
I agree on the need not to run as admin and have been preaching that same message for years.

But it is a flaw in the OS. The reality is that XP was incapable of dealing with those flawed applications wthout forcing the user to run as admin. Ask anyone who used QuickBooks, for example.

The world is full of apps that don't follow best practices. File and registry virtualization is a huge win that allows those apps to work without having to compromise a standard user account.

Also, XP allowed any app to write its files to system locations. Those could have been badly written apps, or they could have been malware. If you were duped into running a well-crafted piece of software that looked innocent and valuable but had a hidden malware component, it dropped its bad stuff into your system locations and into the registry, where they were very difficult to remove. Vista/7 make it much harder to do that.
It is not a failing of the OS.

But it is a flaw in the OS. The reality is that XP was incapable of dealing with those flawed applications wthout forcing the user to run as admin. Ask anyone who used QuickBooks, for example.

I am well aware of this. However it is a failing of QuickBooks and not the OS.

The world is full of apps that don't follow best practices. File and registry virtualization is a huge win that allows those apps to work without having to compromise a standard user account.

I am not in disagreement with you. However those features are present to work around failings of poorly written applications. They do not exist to work around any failing of the OS.

Also, XP allowed any app to write its files to system locations.

No more so than Vista, Windows 7, Linux, or OS X. If you have the appropriate permissions any of these operating systems will allow you to make modifications to the system.

The difference between XP and the other OSes listed is Windows XP, by default, gave the user the necessary permissions. As I said...run as a non-administrator and you won't be able to write to system locations. Thus most malware, as it assume administrative privileges, will fail. Again you're confusing a default configuration (i.e. default user having administrative privileges) with a flaw (i.e. not having any security at all...like the Windows 9x code base).

Vista/7 make it much harder to do that.

No, they do not. Don't run with a privileged account in Windows XP and you'll no more be able to modify the system than Vista/Windows 7.
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Contributr
We live in different worlds
Ed Bott 14th Feb 2010
It would be lovely if only perfect apps existed. But they don't. I just tried to install Office 2007, the current version of Office, from a standard user account. It won't do it. It requires that I enter an administrator's credentials. And once I do that the app is free to write files to any location in the file system or the registry and assign my user permissions to them. A design flaw in XP. Programs in Vista/7 are allowed to write to protected locations only using the Trusted Installer account, which restricts access rights. And anything else is virtualized.

I hear what you're saying. But I still think you're missing many of the design improvements in Windows Vista/7 that make it more secure EVEN IF you were already following best practices with standard user accounts.
...the scenes with Vista/Windows 7?

I just tried to install Office 2007, the current version of Office, from a standard user account. It won't do it.

As it shouldn't because it makes changes to the system. IOW Windows XP is doing exactly what it should...preventing a non-privileged user from making system level changes. That doesn't sound like a flaw to me. That sounds like it's doing exactly what it should be doing.

Programs in Vista/7 are allowed to write to protected locations only using the Trusted Installer account, which restricts access rights.

I just attempted to install Office 2007 under Windows 7 and you know what happened? I received a UAC prompt. And what is a UAC prompt? It's a request for administrative privileges. IOW Windows 7 requires Office 2007 to be installed with administrative privileges just as Windows XP does. If you don't elevate through UAC the installation exits. If I OK the UAC prompt the installer now has complete access to the entire system because I have granted the installer administrative privileges.

Again there's no flaw in Windows XP. Vista and Windows 7 provides features to work around flaws in applications. Not the OS.
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Contributr
Yes, I understand. I don't think you do.
Ed Bott Updated - 14th Feb 2010
An administrator in XP and an administrator in Vista/7 (with UAC enabled) are not the same.

In Vista/7, that consent request passes control to the TrustedInstaller service, which will not allow an installer to write files to protected locations such as the Windows or System32 folders. It will not allow an installer to write to protected keys in the registry. And even an administrator cannot manually add or replace protected files in those locations in Vista/7.

So the program gets installed, but only to the Program Files folder. Any attempts to write to the protected locations I describe get virtualized to locations within the user's profile, which are restricted in their ability to access the rest of the system. They can damage to that user, but they cannot corrupt the entire system.

That's the big design change you keep missing.
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I fully understand virtualization. And as I said, it's a feature to work around broken programs. It is not a feature to fix the OS. Windows XP not having this support does not mean it's flawed. Otherwise Linux and OS X are flawed too.
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Contributr
Whatever (nt)
Ed Bott 14th Feb 2010
...
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Come again?
klumper 14th Feb 2010
Windows is the platform manager, and one of its primary functions in that role is to facilitate the execution of applications, along with their often inherent shortcomings. News flash: the world of coding and scripting has never been uniform or elegant. Windows works with what it can, to the best of its ability in its role as program facilitator. It's never been different and it can't demand ultimate standards of uniformity, so why the chicken vs. egg finger pointing here Ye?

Beyond the weakened but less irritating User Annoyance Control (UAC) from Vista, there have been key ramp ups since XP with Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR), Data Execution Prevention (DEP), Mandatory Integrity Levels, Registry Virtualization and Kernel Patch Protection. Windows SDL is improved even from Vista standards.

There's also the new TCP/IP stack with its improved encryption and authentication options. That along with ASLR, which loads system files as random memory addresses, makes it far harder for basic malware to exploit key system functions.

Ed has already pointed out how applications are prevented from writing to system folders in the W7 file system, and how global registry writes are redirected to a per-user location within the user's profile (as virtual stores). This new virtualization feature has an added bonus - it allows the reg directory to suffer from less bloat!

UAC also acts as the foundation for other useful features, including IE's Protected mode. Stricter limits are placed on what that browser can therefore do without user permission. Inheriting the same elevated security levels are things like ActiveX controls, toolbars and other add-ons.

Does all this make Windows 7 invulnerable to virus and malware penetration? Of course it doesn't. Still there's no point in arguing that there hasn't been significant security improvements in the core design. That doesn't antiquate XP to obsolescence, it's simply an upping of the ante from the time SP2 was introduced to XP.

There are a few other things but not running as an administrator is, IMO, one of the most significant ways to minimize your chances of contracting malware. I believe in it so much I've been running this way since Windows NT 3.51 and have experienced zero malware infections. All while not running anti-malware.

I see. Not a single incident of malware infestation over the last 15 years, during which time you didn't employ as much as a single A-V or anti-malware app as means of a preventative backdrop? All the while running in little more than a standard account, going all the way back to the days of 3.51 huh? .:o

I'm starting to believe you're Ballmer's long lost (but imaginary) step-child. wink
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"Registry virtualization is an application compatibility technology that enables registry write operations that have global impact to be redirected to per-user locations. This redirection is transparent to applications reading from or writing to the registry. It is supported starting with Windows Vista.

This form of virtualization is an interim application compatibility technology; Microsoft intends to remove it from future versions of the Windows operating system as more applications are made compatible with Windows Vista. Therefore, it is important that your application does not become dependent on the behavior of registry virtualization in the system."

http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa965884(VS.85).aspx

Clearly the feature is meant to work around bad applications and is not intended to address a flaw in Windows XP.
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@klumper: Yes, not a single infection.
ye Updated - 15th Feb 2010
I'm starting to believe you're Ballmer's long lost (but imaginary) step-child.

And why is it when someone actually takes advantage of Windows' security others accuse them of being some shill or have some relationship to Microsoft?

As for ASLR, MIL, and KPP those are improvements to Windows, not fixes for flaws. DEP exists in Windows XP since SP2. And has already been stated virtualization is to address flaws with poorly written applications and not to address a specific failing of Windows XP. The sooner people accept it is the applications which are the problem the sooner we can fix it instead of asking Microsoft to add layer after layer to support these broken applications.

Still there's no point in arguing that there hasn't been significant security improvements in the core design.

Had I made such an argument you would have a point. Since I did not you don't.
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The obvious has already been stated, that plenty of apps are incapable of running in the low rights environment of LUA. That's the key reason registry virtualization was introduced as something of a bridging measure for 32-bit processes. Only from Vista, it's conveniently morphed over to W7 -- and though marked for deprecation, will W8 be fated likewise? Since Windows serves the role as/of program facilitator, what other approach would you suggest to get the UAC objectives accomplished?

This is simply Platform Manager 101, legacy bridging measures Windows as an OS has had to do from Day 1 in hopes of moving things forward.

Clearly the feature is meant to work around bad applications and is not intended to address a flaw in Windows XP. Again there's no flaw in Windows XP. Vista and Windows 7 provides features to work around flaws in applications. Not the OS. I fully understand virtualization. And as I said, it's a feature to work around broken programs.

Use an account with administrative privileges and Windows XP is about as resistant to malware as Vista and Windows 7.


These aren't "flawed" or "broken" programs (no many how many times you chant that mantra), and the shortcomings in the XP security model have already been pointed out to you. The design changes (improvements) post-XP allow not only for easier and more transparent privileges elevations, but are core security enhancements to boot. All address the initial issue presented, malware infiltration.

Don't confuse a default configuration with a design flaw.

Splitting hairs again as usual. How can one tout UAC if one isn't going to acknowledge the default config settings have been contributing to the problem? How convenient to compartmentalized these things into segregated blocks -- and how much simpler to embrace ATM instead of shortcomings in the OS design.

Don't run with a privileged account in Windows XP and you'll no more be able to modify the system than Vista/Windows 7.

Nobody I know of in the real world cocooned themselves religiously into a standard account going back to 1995. If that had been the case, it's doubtful you would have gotten any real world work done, unless your time was occupied with surfing the net and haunting talkback boards. Come to think of it, maybe we have our answer... silly

As for ASLR, MIL, and KPP those are improvements to Windows, not fixes for flaws.

Like UAC and reg virt, they are improvements directly affecting core security, something that apparently eludes you in this XP vs post-XP conversation. And when you're enhancing core security, you're addressing flaws and shortcomings. Do I really need to state the inextricable correlation?

And why is it when someone actually takes advantage of Windows' security others accuse them of being some shill?

News Flash #2: Windows "security" prior to SP2 in XP was largely non-existent, thus the vacuum filled by so many 3rd party vendors. Surprised you missed all the remedial ruckus as the computing world matured during that time. So what were all these native protections you were making use of from within Windows going back to 1995 to keep you squeaky clean?

You know, hindsight often makes for a convenient thing to blanket oneself behind, but of course when one possesses eagle-eyed foresight I'm sure such slights of hand needn't be spun.

Yes, not a single infection.

Whatever you say ace. wink
The obvious has already been stated, that plenty of apps are incapable of running in the low rights environment of LUA.

Have I claimed otherwise? If not your point is?

That's the key reason registry virtualization was introduced as something of a bridging measure for 32-bit processes.

I understand this. And I have never said anything to the contrary. So your point is?

These aren't "flawed" or "broken" programs (no many how many times you chant that mantra),

Yes, they are...no matter how many times you chant they're not. The facts are the majority of programs that "need" Administrative rights really don't need them. They were just coded poorly (i.e. not to security best practices). The fact Vista and Windows 7 provide some capability to work around these poorly written apps does not mean XP was flawed. The only way XP could be flawed is if it forced developers to write programs requiring administrative rights. It did not.

Splitting hairs again as usual. How can one tout UAC if one isn't going to acknowledge the default config settings have been contributing to the problem?

Um...that's exactly what I've been doing! Right here:

"The only "flaw" was having the default user be a member of the Administrators account."

"Don't confuse a default configuration with a design flaw."

"The difference between XP and the other OSes listed is Windows XP, by default, gave the user the necessary permissions."

"Again you're confusing a default configuration (i.e. default user having administrative privileges) with a flaw (i.e. not having any security at all...like the Windows 9x code base)."

Seems like I'm acknowledging it quite well.

and how much simpler to embrace ATM instead of shortcomings in the OS design.

What shortcoming are you referring to?

Nobody I know of in the real world cocooned themselves religiously into a standard account going back to 1995.

Why not?

Like UAC and reg virt, they are improvements directly affecting core security, something that apparently eludes you in this XP vs post-XP conversation.

Where did I ever state these weren't improvements? To the contrary:

"As for ASLR, MIL, and KPP those are improvements to Windows, not fixes for flaws."

News Flash #2: Windows "security" prior to SP2 in XP was largely non-existent, thus the vacuum filled by so many 3rd party vendors.

Actually it was pretty reasonable.

Whatever you say ace.

I'm not surprised you'd find this difficult to believe given your complete lack of understanding of the material in question.
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Your problem Ye...
klumper 15th Feb 2010
is that you love to talk from both sides of your mouth, and moreover love to trivialize (mostly via splitting hairs) issues instead of grasping larger concepts - even when they border on the obvious. And this, no matter how clearly or enumerated the presentation of facts to the contrary becomes! Then when you're called on anything, you hide behind "don't put words in my mouth" (and such) like anyone has any choice, with you rambling from every conceivable and miniscule direction.

Go back to your All Things Microsoft corner, and smile knowing you dispatched the misguided on the state of Windows security.
is that you love to talk from both sides of your mouth,

There is no double talk from me. I made a point which you obviously are not capable of understanding.

And this, no matter how clearly or enumerated the presentation of facts to the contrary becomes!

The problem is you're enumerating points which are not in contention. For example I never maed the claim there are few apps which don't work well under LUP. Yet you argued a strawman that I had.

Then when you're called on anything, you hide behind "don't put words in my mouth"

I'm calling it as it is. Unless you can point to a statement where I ever said XP was flawless. Can you? Didn't think so. If you can't argue against the points I make please don't create one's I did not.
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Only in the world of Ye
klumper 15th Feb 2010
Please don't try and project your failings on me.

My only failing was wasting time trying to open your eyes - you would have thought I would have learned from prior excursions. Apparently our in-house Windows guru failed too. How many ways can you spell SOS?

I'm calling it as it is.

And there lies the problem. wink
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@klumper: We call that the "real world".
ye Updated - 15th Feb 2010
Only in the world of Ye

Perhaps you should join the rest of us here.

My only failing was wasting time trying to open your eyes

Misrepresenting what I said and projecting your failings on me is not attempting to open my eyes.

And there lies the problem.

Apparently so. Perhaps if you would join us in the real world we wouldn't be having this discussion.
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Lack of MIL is a structural flaw.
Lester Young Updated - 16th Feb 2010
MIL corrected the free-for-all in interprocess controls that was characteristic of all Windows prior to Vista. The result of that free-for-all is porous boundaries between processes with varying privilege levels. In that situation, running as a non-admin user is NOT equivalent to running as non-admin in UNIX-based systems or Vista/7. The reason I refer to that characteristic as a flaw is that it was deliberately kept in Windows for back-compatibility reasons that ultimately trace back to DOS conventions in early Windows. Having the win32 subsystem natively support the DOS-Windows conventions had to have been one of the worst design decisions Microsoft ever made. NT systems ran DOS through an emulator. It is puzzling that a similar approach to running software dependent on DOS-Windows conventions was not incorporated into win32. So, while software dependent on privileged system access is flawed, pre-Vista Windows is flawed in the way it accommodates flawed software. Microsoft also could have saved a lot of heartburn had they taken intermediate steps, such as a software certification program, between documenting upgraded software standards in 2001 and enforcement of those standards in 2007. [edit: typo]
Lack of MIL is a structural flaw.

XP's lack of MIL is not a flaw. It's a feature added to later versions of Windows. But lack of it is not a flaw.

In that situation, running as a non-admin user is NOT equivalent to running as non-admin in UNIX-based systems or Vista/7.

Wrong. They are effectively the same: Privileged (root/Administrator) and non-privileged (everyone else). At least in the context that the majority of people run UNIX and Windows (i.e. without the use of MAC/MIL).

Windows XP security is quite good if you don't run with a privileged account. Vista and Windows 7 add to it. I've run Windows NT since 3.51 with an unprivileged user and had no malware problems at all. I suspect that's also why I have so few problems with Windows as making system level changes requires higher privileges.
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A bad feature is a flaw.
Lester Young 16th Feb 2010
In this case, the bad feature is the native support for old DOS-Windows conventions that required the ability to elevate privileges in IPCs prior to Vista. That ability to elevate privileges within IPCs is what makes the boundary between user space and elevated privileges porous. A standard user can launch an application which can in turn launch processes with elevated privileges. You do not need admin privileges in XP to launch a chain of processes that may ultimately result in the installation of a rootkit if a malware infection occurs in user space. That is a huge security flaw that was corrected with implementation of MILs.

Better men than I have failed to make you see that, so I guess I shouldn't get my hopes up.

We haven't even discussed the success rates of patching security vulnerabilities in XP and Vista. According to Secunia, XP Pro has 30 unpatched vulnerabilities, with the most severe rated "highly critical." Vista has 5, with the most severe rated "less critical."

XP to Vista/7 is a big jump forward for security any way you look at it.

Have a great day.
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Contributr
Oh fercryinoutloud, ye
Ed Bott 15th Feb 2010
Fine.

(sarcasm)
XP had no design flaws whatsoever. It was freaking awesome. Anyone who gets a virus in XP is an idiot and it's their own damn fault. And Vista/7 simply make Windows EVEN MORE AWESOME than it was already with XP.
(/sarcasm)

There. Now let go of this bone please.
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XP had no design flaws whatsoever.

I never made such a claim. My comment was made clearly wrt to the default account being a member of the Administrators group.

Anyone who gets a virus in XP is an idiot and it's their own damn fault.

I didn't say that either. I have repeatedly acknowledge running as a non-privileged user is not something the average user is going to be able to do in XP. However for those who know and choose to do so XP's security works very well.

There. Now let go of this bone please.

Stop misrepresenting what I said and I'll be happy to. Until then don't expect me to let you continue misrepresenting what I said.
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Contributr
Sheesh
Ed Bott 15th Feb 2010
I could have sworn those were sarcasm tags and not quotation marks, but obviously they mean something different in your world.

I give up.
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@Ed Bott: I expected better of you.
ye Updated - 15th Feb 2010
I could have sworn those were sarcasm tags and not quotation marks, but obviously they mean something different in your world.

Did you really expect to surround your argument with sarcasm tags and expect me to not respond to it as the argument it is?
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