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Inside look at Pentagon's cyberdefense strategy: The battlefield beyond bad flash drives

By | November 28, 2010, 11:24pm PST

Summary: Our nation faces risks far greater than a rogue flash drive: Failure to properly safeguard our consumer and industry systems; unwillingness to invest in ongoing security; and ordinary computer users playing with digital weapons of mass destruction.

Updated: With the news about how 250,000 confidential diplomatic cables got released by Wikileaks, this article becomes even more relevant.

The September/October issue of Foreign Affairs is now available online and within its virtual pages is one of the most important cyberwar articles in modern history.

Written by United States Deputy Secretary of Defense William J. Lynn III, the article is as important to understanding America’s global cyberwarfare strategy as the Monroe Doctrine was to understanding America’s approach to foreign affairs.

It should be noted that Secretary Lynn is the #2 person at the Pentagon, effectively the Pentagon’s chief operating officer and operates as the Secretary of Defense by delegation in the absence of SecDef.

This article, written by Lynn at this time, is more, therefore, than simply an opinion piece by a government functionary. It is a detailed description of American policy in what Lynn calls:

As a doctrinal matter, the Pentagon has formally recognized cyberspace as a new domain of warfare.

Later today, you’ll be able to hear an interview I did on this matter with Voice of America, where I discuss many of the questions that have come up since Lynn’s article became available.

One issue that’s caused a lot of concern is Lynn’s admission that the United States was the victim of a cyberattack in 2008. The attack was caused by an infected flash drive, which propagated attack software throughout a military network.

In my roles as Cyberwarfare Advisor for the International Association of Counterterrorism and Security Professionals, a member of the FBI InfraGard program, and a technology editor and advisor, I have been warning about the flash drives, thumb drives, iPods, iPhones, cameras, and all forms of removable media as a cybersecurity risk for years now.

Given that most of us can roll with 16-32 gigabytes just in our phones, it’s possible for an enemy (or an unwitting accomplice) to bring very dangerous software behind the firewall simply by carrying in a phone or an iPod. It’s also possible for an enemy to remove vast amounts of secured information simply by loading up an iPhone or other handheld device.

The risks, as Lynn details, are far more than just rogue flash drives. However, what this incident shows is the asymmetric nature of cyberwarfare. It’s very easy and very inexpensive for an enemy state, an enemy actor, a terrorist organization, a crime organization, or even teenage hackers to cause measurable damage. For a detailed backgrounder on this disproportionality factor, I recommend reading my article, The coming cyberwar.

One question I was asked by Voice of America is important to address. I was asked if Lynn’s article discloses too much information and gives an advantage to our enemies.

The answer to that is an emphatic “no”. First, there’s nothing in that article our enemies don’t know. Regular, non-technical readers may find it containing shocking news, but for those of us responsible for dealing with cyberattacks, there’s nothing really new from a technical perspective.

What makes this article so important is its policy implications, rather than its technical implications. In Defending a New Domain, the Pentagon’s Cyberstrategy, the United States government is effectively making an international statement on the importance of cyberdefense.

It’s a call to arms for our allies, a cautionary tale for American industry, and a warning shot to those who might attack us.

Before I close this article, I have one more thing important thing to say about America’s cyberdefense. I’ve worked with a lot of people on the front lines of America’s cyberdefense and these are some of the most amazingly smart and aware professionals I’ve every met.

The risk is not with having smart enough people on the job. The risk is our own lack of caution in keeping our consumer and industry systems properly protected, a lack of willingness on the part of managers and policy makers to invest in ongoing security, and the challenge that ordinary computer users are, effectively, playing with digital weapons of mass destruction with barely any awareness of the basic risk.

My final recommendation is simple. Read Lynn’s article. If you’re an IT professional of any level, it’s one of the most important pieces you’ll read this year. (One note: you will need to register to read the article, but registration is free).

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David Gewirtz, Distinguished Lecturer at CBS Interactive, is an author, U.S. policy advisor, and computer scientist. He is featured in The History Channel special The President's Book of Secrets.

Disclosure

David Gewirtz

At various times during his adult life, David has voted for both Democrats and Republicans, and has been disappointed by both. He is deeply disturbed by how partisanship has come before patriotism in America, which gives him the freedom to pick on both sides.

David is a frequent guest on TV and radio stations across America and can usually be heard or seen on-the-air at least once a week. He writes weekly commentary and analysis for CNN’s Anderson Cooper 360 and has been interviewed by Fox News, CNN, various ABC and NBC affiliates, and Canada’s Global TV. He has been a featured guest on National Public Radio and has also been featured on Voice of America, Radio Free Europe, and Radio Liberty where his commentaries on technology, industry, and emerging nations have been broadcast into 46 countries (all in their own unique translations).

David is the executive director of U.S. Strategic Perspective Institute, a nonprofit research and policy organization. He is the Cyberterrorism Advisor for the International Association for Counterterrorism & Security Professionals, a columnist for The Journal of Counterterrorism and Homeland Security and a special contributor to Frontline Security Magazine. He is a member of the FBI’s InfraGard program, the security partnership between the FBI and industry. David is also a member of the U.S. Naval Institute and the National Defense Industrial Association, the leading defense industry association promoting national security.

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Biography

David Gewirtz

In addition to hosting the ZDNet Government and ZDNet DIY-IT blogs, CBS Interactive's Distinguished Lecturer David Gewirtz is an author, U.S. policy advisor, and computer scientist. He is featured in The History Channel special The President's Book of Secrets, is one of America's foremost cyber-security experts, and is a top expert on saving and creating jobs. He is also director of the U.S. Strategic Perspective Institute as well as the founder of ZATZ Publishing.

David is a member of FBI InfraGard, the Cyberwarfare Advisor for the International Association for Counterterrorism & Security Professionals, a columnist for The Journal of Counterterrorism and Homeland Security, and has been a regular CNN contributor, and a guest commentator for the Nieman Watchdog of the Nieman Foundation for Journalism at Harvard University. He is the author of Where Have All the Emails Gone?, the definitive study of email in the White House, as well as How To Save Jobs and The Flexible Enterprise, the classic book that served as a foundation for today's agile business movement.

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RE: Inside look at Pentagon's cyberdefense strategy: The battlefield beyond bad flash drives
artrobin11@... 5th Dec 2010
I work for the NAVY and was USAF - The idea of not classifying anything except troop movement and locations is clearly not well thought out - Encryption keys and highly sensitive material should ALWAYS be classified - among many other thing that would put our troops NAD OUR country in harm's way. If you don't work or have never worked in the field then you REALLY need to reconsider your stand.
i read about the attack and i want to know one thing - who the hell made the secret network connected to the unclassified network? that person should be taken out and shot as well as who ever approved it.
@stevejg61

Yah. When i was working in Navy crypto (Viet Nam), we had "Red" (cleartext) and "Black" (encrypted) loops which did nutconnect directly.

Who was dumb enough to (apparently) change that doctrine?
@stevejg61

Then you would want to shoot the President, because it was most likely him (past President, not Obama) who greenlighted this.
@Lerianis10 is that the pres that had a vice that invented the internet
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Really! Really!
wsimpson58 27th Aug 2010
@Lerianis10
Do you realy think W was cable or desiring to render judgment on such a technical issue. George wanted to be Ronnie, but lacks the verve to pull it off.
Until they realise that security can't be an afterthought and that a system has to be built from the ground up with security as the No.1 priority this sort of thing will keep happening.
@AndyPagin Even building from the "ground up" will NOT guarantee the pickup of bad stuff very quickly.
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Until we can attack the people that are attacking us (my servers get hammered hundreds of times each day), we're well and truly doomed.
@rick@...

Never going to be allowed to happen. First off, someone's system might have been hijacked without their knowledge, and when you attack them you are punishing them wrongly.
Secondly, it is VERY HARD to trace back an attack today if people are using proxy connections and things that 'strip' identifying data out of their packets.
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Not quite right
Str0b0 27th Aug 2010
@Lerianis10 That's not entirely true. When it comes to Joe Hacker who just wants to cause a little mayhem you're right, but make no mistake there are foreign powers attempting, and succeeding, in compromising our vital networks. Most notably China, although they won't admit to it. Considering our standard military doctrine is to match and surpass enemy capability then you should believe we have people doing the same thing. The only difference is that when one of ours compromises a Chinese system the Chinese don't run an article about it in the news.
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Vicious circle.
magallanes Updated - 26th Aug 2010
Hacker (black hat) sometimes turn into White Hat.
And White Hat is key for to create countermeasure and to protect their system.
But, under the DMCA, hackers are illegals (almost terrorists) so, without hacker then there are not white hat, and without white hat then there are a expert in security.

So, most of the security is based in foreign companies, mostly russian (or ex-russian).

ps :ethical hacker courses are a joke.
Dont drink the water...and,

Don't trust the vendors!!

Hey David, what do you way we move the entire government off of Dell (all of the USAF bases I was at were splattered with Dell machines) and move them onto OS X?

Hahaha! Thought that might make your head spin a little. But if all end users got Minis maybe we'd save on electricity?

All joking aside, there were a number of years when I don't think matter were taken seriously enough and I believe it was partly a lack of pressure exerted by elected officials into putting resources into hardening. Now I believe we are in a game of catch-up, and at the worst possible time--when agencies need (or at least believe they need) access to everything at all times, and through the same machine.

Bad practices all around.

Your article even mentions the ingredients for the wikkileaks event, and whether someoneone believes the public has a right to that data, I believe in all circumstances in a "wingman"--and data access quotas that require dual-member authentication to surpass.

Maybe the army pvt was helped by his supervisor, but if his access to THAT much data were dependent on the servers logging an authentication of his supervisor's or coworker's CAC, I know he would have had to pry my card from my cold, dead, hands to gain access to it.
The best thing that they could do is to have military flash drives (that are wiped on a regular basis) that never leave the building (unless someone is escorted) and computers that NEVER TOUCH THE INTERNET at all.

Burning a CD just for a 13KB file like one person said he had to do recently is WASTEFUL in the extreme and unnecessary.
Here is another thing that I just thought of: why don't we just have almost all information UNclassified. There is no reason to have anything except current troop movements and locations classified.
@Lerianis10

I think your idea is the best. Our real enemy is our own incomprehensible foreign policy. What would we do without the Cuba embargo, for instance...

gary
@gdstark13

Easy, go sightseeing in Havana, of course.

The embargo of Cuba does not truly hurt the Cubans, they simply do an `end run` around US. Florida is in a perfect location to reap the benefits of trade with Cuba, but.....

Politics.

It all boils down to who has the bigger set of cojones. Who is going to say `Uncle` first, US or the Cubans?
The clear pattern I see over and over is a FAILURE to learn from History! We are a REactive country, as much as we like to publicize how PROactive we are! To this country's nations, "proactivity" consists of telling someone else about it, figuring we did our duty, and moving on to something else more interesting. We're boring. And we're beatable f anyone ever thinks outside the wrong box.
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What scares me is the Irish potato famine.
a foot in both camps 26th Aug 2010
Got your attention?
The great famine in the mid 1800s has been reported to be due to the dependency of the Irish on the potato for food resulting in 1 million deaths and 1 million people fleeing the country. What a tragic situation as a result of a dependency on a crop monoculture.
What scares me is the small number of types of Client and Server operating systems.
That's close to a software systems monoculture.

Server systems:
The market is dominated by Linux and Microsoft servers.
Of course there are mainframe operating systems that act as servers too.

Client systems:
Here Microsoft is dominant with some 91% of PCs running Windows.

So will we have one day an attack that disables the dominant server and client operating systems?
Could the defence for servers be to
1. eschew the dominants
and
2. develop unique server systems for critically important defence systems?

I can't envisage any defence stategy for client systems. OS/X systems share is some 5% and Linux distributions some 1%, others less than 1%.
So what chance of a polyculture of client systems here?
@a foot in both camps
There are countless system architectures available, not just the two or three we use on our toy x86 boxes. There are highly classified operating systems designed specifically for high security work that are utterly unbreakable, (don't bother googling', believe me you won't find anything). Problem is once some idiot provides an authenticated gateway to the web - the whole thing's screwed.
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Cybersecurity
smharmon1 26th Aug 2010
The cybersecurity trope is a make-work program for the behemoth (MI complex) contractors building these systems that are way behind technically, riddled with bad architectures, and encumbered with bad O/S design (i.e. Windows). Fix the problem at the root, get rid of these behemoths and replace with Unix/Linux or MacOS.
I think it's unfair to single out the iPhone or iPad when any mobile device is capable of doing the same thing, or are you saying that Mac products are better and therefore, more dangerous.
The real problem is more basic; We don't/won't/cannot trust the people who might have a clue. We do trust those who do not fall into those categories. To get access you must be trusted. To be trusted you must not have the skillset/mindset needed. The other side probably have 2 bods for this ...the untrustworthy geek and a trustworthy semi geek with a gun to shoot the geek if they think he/she is wrong. This is simplistic and I am sure its more complicated than this but you get the idea. The nature of trust and the reality of cyber hostility are mutually exclusive. If you do not think so you are missing something. At an institutional level trust is moved to the opposite end of the spectrum from the mindset needed to realise the possibilities of cyberwarfare
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OS and AV Support?
madrucke@... 26th Aug 2010
Even with Windows7 I can't mount my Mobile Devices to be seen and scanned by my AV!

Without OS Patches that make USB and other removable media appear as part of the "real" system we have to ban everything from our workspace. Thus crippling productivity.

IT Security Paranoiacs need to find a way to "read-in" as many end users as possible.

Simply Banning anything that might be used improperly is *not* the answer!

Fix The OS! If the US Government would threaten to dump Windows and go to something else... Maybe *then* M$ would get off it's butt and fix the OS!

Unfortunately, with Government one size fits all and even us developers get caught in the cross-fire and have find creative ways to circumvent IT Security Paranoia! Not to violate security. But, simply to do our jobs!
Basically off-shoring provides non-US Citizens access to info inside American companies !
when I worked in military security, and like that other guy with crypo, (but in the 1980's). It was the same does, we had red and black for insecure and secure. We could NEVER bring anything like phones, cameras, even notebook into the secure area.

And these days, at the same places there would be strick rules about USB memory sticks, phones, phone with cameras, WiFi, and network connections.

In the secure area, you would not have access to the data, and the underlying code or Operating system access.
Techs would fix the software, and operators would operate the equipment.

All on a 'need to know' basis, this is if you do not need access or need to know, you dont get access to that information.

All the computers would be sealed (for tempest), and there would be no access to the internals by ANY means, (such as network ports, or USB, or COM ports).

Also for the critical information, and the highly secret info, what is it doing being publicly accessible (by hackers), and sitting on the internet. The (US) military, have their own communications satellites, and their own communications networks, SEPERATE from the public.

The two networks, (the military public face, and the military operational net) should be and are seperate systems.

Its not big deal if someone hacks into the pantagons web site, if its only its public face, and anything sensitive is not accessible from that network..

If it is, someone, or alot of people should be removed from their position.

Yes, a system can be (almost) totally secure, simply by making it physically secure and defending it and isolating it.

That is what the military has always done, There is no way that hacking into a ships crews email servier (has to be on the net and its a public site), does not mean that via that email server there is any physical way to connect to operational systems.

So to eliminate this threat is easy, accept that people will try to hack what they find on the internet, so dont put your stuff you do not want "on the net" on those systems you have CONNECTED to the net.

And im quite sure, as they have done allways in the past, with the RED and BLACK secure and plain text that the two still do not mix.

Military operational system are by design almost impossible to hack into.. They are held in highly secure areas, they are not net connected in any way, they do not use "standard PC archeticure, or software" they are not 'field programmable'. And most do not have hard drives with code that you can access of modify.

If you want to talk about 'soft' and 'hard' targets then military operational systems and encryption systems would rank as the hardest of the hard to gain access too, not to mention understand or modify.

Ive dont courses on these encryption systems and im sure that other fellow would recognise some of the codes for crypto machines, KW, BID's and so on im sure where used in his day, as well as mine.. Great machines.

One of the places I worked in crypto was 4 floors underground, on a floor that was not accessable without a keycard, and 6 yes 6 security code numbers, plus live people to check your identity, and I worked an a SAFE, and Vault like in a bank, except stronger and HUGE, biggest in the southern hemiphere!.

So to say physical security was tight was an understatement.

Do a course on this equipment, you will not be allowed to take notes or take the manuals home to study.

Have to get spare parts for this equipment (from the NSA), you have to draw pistols, loaded, and take a security guard and one other all armed, carrying a lead seal, locked strong box.

All the equipment had explosive charges in them, that in the event of an attack and being overtaken you can destroy the equipment so the enemy does not get it, there are also axes and sledge happers on hand for same job.

(never had to chance to do that, felt like it sometimes!!)..

All equipment and keymats are ordated each day, and if something is missing, NO ONE goes home until its found. (and the big guys get involved, and heads will roll).

Military know about ECM, or electronic countermeasures, and countercountermeasures. They have been doing it since year dot..

Unless something major has happend in the US military in the past 10 years, I expect it is still the same.
to view a partial list of crimes committed by FBI agents over 1500 pages long see
forums.signonsandiego. com/showthread.php?t=59139

to view a partial list of FBI agents arrested for pedophilia see
campusactivism. org/phpBB3/viewforum.php?f=29


also see
ctka.net/pr500-king.html
As a longtime investigative reporter who's covered dozens of covert operations and war crimes stories here's the solution: open data. The US military budget is unsustainable and predicated on scarcity of...everything. The world is moving towards sustainability and security budgets that increasingly rely on collaboration and networking. It's a massive disconnect...not least because the nonmilitary infrastructure in the US (rail, hydroelectric, water, tide/earthquake) is creaking and Third World in many jurisdictions.
Re the US's ?irrational? obsession with classification and secrecy, see here
http://www.fas.org/blog/secrecy/
I repeat, the ONLY real solution is to integrate the InZerosystems device throughout the entire gov't.
this stuff happens all the time da.
its' just because of the volume it made to the front page. it could also be a plot by the us to monitor traffic to the web site and see who is watching.
I work for the NAVY and was USAF - The idea of not classifying anything except troop movement and locations is clearly not well thought out - Encryption keys and highly sensitive material should ALWAYS be classified - among many other thing that would put our troops NAD OUR country in harm's way. If you don't work or have never worked in the field then you REALLY need to reconsider your stand.

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