Inside look at Pentagon's cyberdefense strategy: The battlefield beyond bad flash drives
Summary: Our nation faces risks far greater than a rogue flash drive: Failure to properly safeguard our consumer and industry systems; unwillingness to invest in ongoing security; and ordinary computer users playing with digital weapons of mass destruction.
Updated: With the news about how 250,000 confidential diplomatic cables got released by Wikileaks, this article becomes even more relevant.
The September/October issue of Foreign Affairs is now available online and within its virtual pages is one of the most important cyberwar articles in modern history.
Written by United States Deputy Secretary of Defense William J. Lynn III, the article is as important to understanding America's global cyberwarfare strategy as the Monroe Doctrine was to understanding America's approach to foreign affairs.
It should be noted that Secretary Lynn is the #2 person at the Pentagon, effectively the Pentagon's chief operating officer and operates as the Secretary of Defense by delegation in the absence of SecDef.
This article, written by Lynn at this time, is more, therefore, than simply an opinion piece by a government functionary. It is a detailed description of American policy in what Lynn calls:
As a doctrinal matter, the Pentagon has formally recognized cyberspace as a new domain of warfare.
Later today, you'll be able to hear an interview I did on this matter with Voice of America, where I discuss many of the questions that have come up since Lynn's article became available.
One issue that's caused a lot of concern is Lynn's admission that the United States was the victim of a cyberattack in 2008. The attack was caused by an infected flash drive, which propagated attack software throughout a military network.
In my roles as Cyberwarfare Advisor for the International Association of Counterterrorism and Security Professionals, a member of the FBI InfraGard program, and a technology editor and advisor, I have been warning about the flash drives, thumb drives, iPods, iPhones, cameras, and all forms of removable media as a cybersecurity risk for years now.
Given that most of us can roll with 16-32 gigabytes just in our phones, it's possible for an enemy (or an unwitting accomplice) to bring very dangerous software behind the firewall simply by carrying in a phone or an iPod. It's also possible for an enemy to remove vast amounts of secured information simply by loading up an iPhone or other handheld device.
The risks, as Lynn details, are far more than just rogue flash drives. However, what this incident shows is the asymmetric nature of cyberwarfare. It's very easy and very inexpensive for an enemy state, an enemy actor, a terrorist organization, a crime organization, or even teenage hackers to cause measurable damage. For a detailed backgrounder on this disproportionality factor, I recommend reading my article, The coming cyberwar.
One question I was asked by Voice of America is important to address. I was asked if Lynn's article discloses too much information and gives an advantage to our enemies.
The answer to that is an emphatic "no". First, there's nothing in that article our enemies don't know. Regular, non-technical readers may find it containing shocking news, but for those of us responsible for dealing with cyberattacks, there's nothing really new from a technical perspective.
What makes this article so important is its policy implications, rather than its technical implications. In Defending a New Domain, the Pentagon's Cyberstrategy, the United States government is effectively making an international statement on the importance of cyberdefense.
It's a call to arms for our allies, a cautionary tale for American industry, and a warning shot to those who might attack us.
Before I close this article, I have one more thing important thing to say about America's cyberdefense. I've worked with a lot of people on the front lines of America's cyberdefense and these are some of the most amazingly smart and aware professionals I've every met.
The risk is not with having smart enough people on the job. The risk is our own lack of caution in keeping our consumer and industry systems properly protected, a lack of willingness on the part of managers and policy makers to invest in ongoing security, and the challenge that ordinary computer users are, effectively, playing with digital weapons of mass destruction with barely any awareness of the basic risk.
My final recommendation is simple. Read Lynn's article. If you're an IT professional of any level, it's one of the most important pieces you'll read this year. (One note: you will need to register to read the article, but registration is free).
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Talkback
RE: Inside look at Pentagon's cyberdefense strategy: The battlefield beyond bad flash drives
RE: Inside look at Pentagon's cyberdefense strategy: The battlefield beyond bad flash drives
Yah. When i was working in Navy crypto (Viet Nam), we had "Red" (cleartext) and "Black" (encrypted) loops which did <i><b>nut</b></i>connect directly.
Who was dumb enough to (apparently) change that doctrine?
RE: Inside look at Pentagon's cyberdefense strategy: The battlefield beyond bad flash drives
Really good
RE: Inside look at Pentagon's cyberdefense strategy: The battlefield beyond bad flash drives
Then you would want to shoot the President, because it was most likely him (past President, not Obama) who greenlighted this.
RE: Inside look at Pentagon's cyberdefense strategy: The battlefield beyond bad flash drives
Really! Really!
Do you realy think W was cable or desiring to render judgment on such a technical issue. George wanted to be Ronnie, but lacks the verve to pull it off.
RE: Inside look at Pentagon's cyberdefense strategy: The battlefield beyond bad flash drives
RE: Inside look at Pentagon's cyberdefense strategy: The battlefield beyond bad flash drives
Our cyber defense policy is really stupid
RE: Inside look at Pentagon's cyberdefense strategy: The battlefield beyond bad flash drives
Never going to be allowed to happen. First off, someone's system might have been hijacked without their knowledge, and when you attack them you are punishing them wrongly.
Secondly, it is VERY HARD to trace back an attack today if people are using proxy connections and things that 'strip' identifying data out of their packets.
Not quite right
Vicious circle.
RE: Inside look at Pentagon's cyberdefense strategy: The battlefield beyond bad flash drives
Don't trust the vendors!!
Hey David, what do you way we move the entire government off of Dell (all of the USAF bases I was at were splattered with Dell machines) and move them onto OS X?
Hahaha! Thought that might make your head spin a little. But if all end users got Minis maybe we'd save on electricity?
All joking aside, there were a number of years when I don't think matter were taken seriously enough and I believe it was partly a lack of pressure exerted by elected officials into putting resources into hardening. Now I believe we are in a game of catch-up, and at the worst possible time--when agencies need (or at least believe they need) access to everything at all times, and through the same machine.
Bad practices all around.
Your article even mentions the ingredients for the wikkileaks event, and whether someoneone believes the public has a right to that data, I believe in all circumstances in a "wingman"--and data access quotas that require dual-member authentication to surpass.
Maybe the army pvt was helped by his supervisor, but if his access to THAT much data were dependent on the servers logging an authentication of his supervisor's or coworker's CAC, I know he would have had to pry my card from my cold, dead, hands to gain access to it.
RE: Inside look at Pentagon's cyberdefense strategy: The battlefield beyond bad flash drives
Burning a CD just for a 13KB file like one person said he had to do recently is WASTEFUL in the extreme and unnecessary.
RE: Inside look at Pentagon's cyberdefense strategy: The battlefield beyond bad flash drives
RE: Inside look at Pentagon's cyberdefense strategy: The battlefield beyond bad flash drives
I think your idea is the best. Our real enemy is our own incomprehensible foreign policy. What would we do without the Cuba embargo, for instance...
gary
RE: What would we do without the Cuba embargo, for instance...
Easy, go sightseeing in Havana, of course.
The embargo of Cuba does not truly hurt the Cubans, they simply do an `end run` around US. Florida is in a perfect location to reap the benefits of trade with Cuba, but.....
Politics.
It all boils down to who has the bigger set of cojones. Who is going to say `Uncle` first, US or the Cubans?
RE: Inside look at Pentagon's cyberdefense strategy: The battlefield beyond bad flash drives
What scares me is the Irish potato famine.
The great famine in the mid 1800s has been reported to be due to the dependency of the Irish on the potato for food resulting in 1 million deaths and 1 million people fleeing the country. What a tragic situation as a result of a dependency on a crop monoculture.
What scares me is the small number of types of Client and Server operating systems.
That's close to a software systems monoculture.
Server systems:
The market is dominated by Linux and Microsoft servers.
Of course there are mainframe operating systems that act as servers too.
Client systems:
Here Microsoft is dominant with some 91% of PCs running Windows.
So will we have one day an attack that disables the dominant server and client operating systems?
Could the defence for servers be to
1. eschew the dominants
and
2. develop unique server systems for critically important defence systems?
I can't envisage any defence stategy for client systems. OS/X systems share is some 5% and Linux distributions some 1%, others less than 1%.
So what chance of a polyculture of client systems here?
RE: Inside look at Pentagon's cyberdefense strategy: The battlefield beyond bad flash drives
There are countless system architectures available, not just the two or three we use on our toy x86 boxes. There are highly classified operating systems designed specifically for high security work that are utterly unbreakable, (don't bother googling', believe me you won't find anything). Problem is once some idiot provides an authenticated gateway to the web - the whole thing's screwed.