Should "Standard User" be the default in Windows 7?
Summary: It seems clear to me that combining an Admin accounts with Windows 7's "low nag" User Account Control (UAC) setting is a bad idea. Problem is, Admin accounts and "low nag" UAC settings will be the default for millions of people buying Windows 7-based PCs.
It seems clear to me that combining an Admin accounts with Windows 7's "low nag" User Account Control (UAC) setting is a bad idea. Problem is, Admin accounts and "low nag" UAC settings will be the default for millions of people buying Windows 7-based PCs.
The problem with systems running with these two settings is that it's possible to use a code-injection vulnerability to silently run code or other applications with administrative privileges behind the user's back. Even Windows super-guru Mark Russinovich acknowledges that a problem exists:
Several people have observed that it's possible for third-party software running in a PA account with standard user rights to take advantage of auto-elevation to gain administrative rights. For example, the software can use the WriteProcessMemory API to inject code into Explorer and the CreateRemoteThread API to execute that code, a technique called DLL injection. Since the code is executing in Explorer, which is a Windows executable, it can leverage the COM objects that auto-elevate, like the Copy/Move/Rename/Delete/Link Object, to modify system registry keys or directories and give the software administrative rights. While true, these steps require deliberate intent, aren't trivial, and therefore are not something we believe legitimate developers would opt for versus fixing their software to run with standard user rights. In fact, we recommend against any application developer taking a dependency on the elevation behavior in the system and that application developers test their software running in standard user mode.The follow-up observation is that malware could gain administrative rights using the same techniques. Again, this is true, but as I pointed out earlier, malware can compromise the system via prompted elevations as well. From the perspective of malware, Windows 7's default mode is no more or less secure than the Always Notify mode ("Vista mode"), and malware that assumes administrative rights will still break when run in Windows 7's default mode.
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So, a problem exists, and not only is it something that malware authors could use but we could even see software developers using the trick to make their product less naggy than the competition. The solution is to change default settings, something that most people out there in Computer Land won't even know is possible.
Another flaw is to assume that just because someone is running Admin account, they would accept all prompts thrown their way anyway. The problem with this is that the current settings allow a behind-the-scenes code injection to stealthily mess around with a system.
It seems to me that Microsoft has backed itself into a corner. It tried to make UAC less naggy, but by doing so introduced some serious vulnerabilities. The only advice it can offer to counter these vulnerabilities is that users should change default settings. Why not just make these more secure settings the default? Because it would break stuff. Like I said, Microsoft is backed into a corner.
My view is that Microsoft should make Standard user the default user on systems. Sure, it would break some stuff, but eventually something has to change because the current situation can't last forever. It's clear that Admin accounts are a security vulnerability in the hands of those who don't understand what it means to be running Admin accounts.
[UPDATE: Here's a video of the code-injection vulnerability in action:
Bottom line is that this tweaking to the UAC make Windows 7 less safe than Vista. If you think anything else, you are wrong.]
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Talkback
You'll always need the Admin account
I think that the Win7 system is a necessary evil and a decent compromise. Users will be _generally_ safer, but can still do admin tasks inline without logging into a second account.
You're thinking in XP terms
There's no need to log out before installing something, I can't remember the last time I did that in Vista or Win 7.
Actualy
Yes, you're right
Unfortunately this is another example of convenience trumping...
Not only that
So the standard account won't necessarily save a person. It still comes down to users educating themselves.
You bet. Something I've advocated.
down to users educating themselves.[/i]
At least the user education part. I don't expect them to do it themselves.
Unfortunately there are a lot of people who don't want to learn. They're
perfectly happy being ignorant.
Why do they offer these options?
Explorer shouldn't be elevated to begin with. You should be able to elevate it for perhaps a series of operations but normally it should run with user rights.
Sadly convenience is worth more money. MS has proven you don't need security to be the top dog.
RE: Why do they offer these options?
We return you now to normal programming.
That's the million dollar question.
For all those people who want to know why Microsoft didn't take security seriously convenience is the answer. Despite all the demand Microsoft secure their OS we see people really don't want security if it comes at the expense of convenience.
That's right
That's what happens when you have 10+ years of running things in your admin account. They should've introduced something like this way back in 90s.
And you're going to tell people to change their habits at this late date?
Not buying it
story is that users were annoyed that they had to enter a password for
everything, including putting a shortcut on the desktop. It wasn't a user
problem, like most things Microsoft, it was a usability problem.
LOL! Wasn't that a problem in the BETA version?
everything, including putting a shortcut on the desktop.[/i]
I don't receive any UAC prompt for placing a shortcut on the desktop. Perhaps if you actually used Vista you would come to learn most of these "issues" are nothing more than FUD.
all users vs specific user desktop
As it should be really.
@rtk: That is correct.
Installers tend to be the means for creating shortcuts on the All Users Desktop. Which means deleting them would require elevation.
Shortcut on the desktop?
Some of this is MS's fault, but the truth is that the vast majority actions the generate a UAC prompt in vista would require you to sudo in *nix.
The only advantage in *nix is that the sudo lasts for some period of time, so you can run that command again without entering a PW.
For the most part, I don't get that many UACs. I will change the security when I install 7.
U.A.C. is not designed....
But, the solution isn't to make "standard user" the default, it's for microsoft to retighten the UAC by default and if you think you're cool enough to run with a weak UAC then you've got to figure it out for yourself.
The problem, as I understand it, is...
Maybe the UAC prompt
Wrong... Ubuntu Linux does without
My own personal opinion is that the Windows file system/security model is irretrievably broken anyway